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ABSTRACT 
The Historiography of the Allied Bombing Campaign of Germany 
by  
Ryan Hopkins 
  
This thesis is a historiographical study concerning the strategic bombing campaign of Germany 
during World War II.  The study questions how effective the campaign was in comparing the 
prewar theories to wartime practices.  Secondly, it questions the morality of the bombings and 
how and why bombing techniques changed throughout the course of the war.  Lastly, the study 
looks at a recent topic in the historic community, which is the question of remembrance and 
Germans as victims of the war. 
This study concludes that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany was a success but not in 
the sense that prewar planners had anticipated.  The moral implications of the bombings were 
horrific, but given the severity of the war they were fighting, were a necessity.  The question of 
Germans as victims will be open to debate for some time, especially because Germans and 
Americans have opposing viewpoints on the matter.  
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 World War II was the deadliest event in human history.  It differed from previous 
conflicts by the fact that civilians were purposely singled out as important military targets.  The 
morale and economy of civilians in combatant nations are equally as important as the soldiers 
who are fighting the enemy at the front.   This has been the case for thousands of years.  It was 
the introduction of the airplane, more specifically the bomber, that would change the way wars 
would be fought regarding civilian populations.  Bombers are capable of hitting targets behind 
the enemy‟s lines, thus disrupting the morale and the economy at the same time.  By the 
beginning of World War II, a theory of indiscriminate bombing was widely accepted in the 
military by most industrialized nations.  Many aviation pioneers believed strategic bombing to be 
the next step in the evolution of the art of warfare.  It was only after World War II that historians 
were able to analyze the catastrophic effects of the bombings in Germany and Japan.  Since then, 
countless books and articles have been written debating whether or not such a deliberate attack 
on civilians was justified morally and of its effectiveness.  In more recent years, the question of 
German civilians being victims of the bombing war has stirred even more controversy in the 
historical community.   To understand why historians are still debating the necessity of the Allied 
bombing campaign, one must understand the history of air power and strategic bombing leading 
up to the allied destruction of Germany.   
Many writers focus primarily on the European theatre of war.  This is probably because 
Europe is the birthplace of strategic bombing.
1
  In the fall of 1911, less than eight years after the 
Wright brothers‟ sustained flight, the Italians were the first to attack civilian targets.  They had 
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designed biplanes to drop bombs in Tunisia and Tripoli during the final stages of the  
colonization of Africa.  The attacks were on a very small scale and very ineffective.  Shortly 
after, reports circulated through Europe and Italian actions were heavily criticized by the press.
2
  
In the summer of 1914, World War I broke out in Europe.  The Great War was different 
from every previous war in that new weapons and machines of modern industry presented new 
challenges to the nations involved.  Heavy weaponry like the machine gun and more powerful 
artillery shredded infantry by the thousands, leading to a stalemate on the Western front.  
Initially, both sides used aircraft for reconnaissance. As the ferocity of the war intensified on the 
ground, the war in the air intensified to hit the enemy behind the front lines. The British were the 
first to conduct organized aerial attacks on military targets.  As early as October, 1914, the Royal 
Naval Air Service began mounting raids on the Zeppelin bases in Friedrichshafen.  Because the 
targets were large and flammable, small twenty pound bombs were successfully used in their 
missions.
3
   
In January 1915, Germany became the first nation in the war to attack civilian targets by 
bombing eastern England.   They would later attack civilian targets in Paris and other French 
cities.
4
  German Zeppelins had a better range, higher altitude, and heavier payload than the 
British or French planes, but the size and susceptibility of the massive airships made them 
impractical for any kind of strategic bombing.   After a raid on England in September 1916, five 
Zeppelins were shot down and Germany decided to remove Zeppelins from combat roles and 
focus on their new Gotha aircraft.
5
 However, after these attacks, panic spread among the British 
population and its government.  The psychological effect was high and remained that way for 
decades afterwards.
6
  By the beginning of 1918, the newly formed Royal Air Force had begun 
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strategic bombings of industrial targets in Germany.  Major General Hugh Trenchard has been 
described  
as the father of the Royal Air Force and saw sporadic combat throughout World War I.  When he 
returned to France in the summer of 1918, he began developing new ideas for aerial warfare.  
First, he realized that air superiority and destruction of enemy air fields was crucial.  The air 
units must work in conjunction with the ground units.  After that, the enemy‟s railways and 
supply lines must be destroyed to ensure that men and material would be at a disadvantage to an 
advancing army.  In addition, he also saw potential for bombing industrial targets such as 
chemical plants, iron mines, coal mines, gun foundries, and repair shops. He even insisted that 
the French and British combine air forces into a single service for long distance bombing.
7
 
Trenchard‟s ideas came too late in the war for application.  On November 11, 1918, World War I 
ended.  Immediately after, each nation began cutting back on military spending.  The war in 
Europe was over, but strategic bombing theory was only beginning.   
Several more air power theorists emerged with new ideas about strategic bombing during 
the interwar period.  Giulio Douhet was an Italian artillery officer during World War I.  Douhet 
saw many flaws in the way the Italian army collaborated with its air force and suggested bomber 
fleets designed to bomb the enemy daily.  His suggestion was ignored.  After the war, he became 
one of the first theorists to lay out his ideas in published works.
8
 In 1921, in his most famous 
work, Command of the Air, he described the importance of airpower in the next (and inevitable) 
war involving Germany and France.  He wrote Germany would use terror bombings to level 
cities before armies could be mobilized.  He noted that even if cities were not completely 
destroyed, the morale of the people would break.
9
 Air power opened up a new dimension in  
warfare, and while the army and navy may fail, the bomber would always gets through. Douhet 
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never wrote about combined arms warfare but did recognize the importance of an air force 
working together with other branches of the military with the air force being the senior branch.
10
  
In the United States, the great air power theorist was Billy Mitchell.  He, like Douhet and 
Trenchard, was a veteran of World War I.  Mitchell worked closely with the British and French 
air forces, studying their tactics and forming new theories of his own.  He and Trenchard met in 
France and discussed the importance of strategic air power.
11
 Mitchell recognized the importance 
of air power for the United States.  Britain and America, being maritime powers, needed to 
concentrate heavily on their air forces, because they had no immediate land enemies.  Mitchell 
believed that the bomber would subsidize land armies and make the Navy obsolete.
12
  In 1921, 
he arranged demonstrations proving that air craft could destroy naval vessels.  Although the test 
was a success, the Army, Navy, and Congress denied any technical expansion or development of 
the U.S. Bomber fleet.
13
 Mitchell, like Douhet, wrote a series of articles and books such as Our 
Air Force: the Keystone of National Defense and Winged Defense. In his writings, Mitchell 
believed that in the next war bombers would strike targets of production, transportation, and 
agriculture and destroy the enemy‟s means of waging war.14 This was the fundamental idea of 
strategic bombing.   
Arthur Harris, a member of the Royal Flying Corps during World War I, was another 
pioneer of strategic bombing in Britain during the interwar period.   Following World War I, 
Harris was posted to the newly acquired British territory of Iraq.  The instability in Iraq and other 
parts of the Middle East was escalating, so Harris ordered the conversion of British Victoria 
transports into the first postwar long range heavy bombers.
15
 By 1922, the bombers were used to  
quell several uprisings against British troops.  The handful of bombers appeared to be achieving  
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more than what thousands of soldiers could do, and Harris was pleased with the results, adding to 
the belief that the bomber could single handedly win wars.
16
 
When Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power in 1933, one of the main goals of 
the Third Reich was rearmament.  Enormous amounts of money went into rebuilding the German 
military.  In March 1935 the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) was unveiled to the world and 
German conscription went into effect.
17
 By 1936 Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland and 
military expenditure soared.  Herman Goering, commander of the Luftwaffe, was head of the 
Four-Year Plan, launched in 1936, to ensure that German economy would be prepared for total 
war within four years.
18
  
Germany had no official doctrine for strategic bombing.  Many in Germany felt that 
tactical bombing was better suited for the Luftwaffe.  Germany‟s strategy was combined arms 
warfare, which would use bombers in coordination with land units.
19
 In 1936 Germany was still 
a neutral player in the world but wanted to aid the fascist revolt that was gaining momentum in 
Spain.  Initially, Hitler was careful about what type of aid he would send to Spain, not wanting to 
breach international laws.  However, once proof was found that Russian made bombs were being 
used against Franco‟s armies, Hitler ordered a full scale intervention. The Luftwaffe force sent to 
Spain was known as the “Condor Legion” and consisted of an all volunteer force. 20 Erhard 
Milch, State Secretary of the Reich‟s Aviation Ministry, observed the Luftwaffe‟s actions in 
Spain.  The most famous incident of the Luftwaffe in Spain took place in April 1937 when the 
Luftwaffe obliterated the civilian population in the Spanish town of Guernica.
21
 The bombing of 
Guernica was a moral tragedy and the raid was not a great success.  Milch had studied Douhet‟s 
writings and after putting the ideas into practice in Spain, Milch knew that the Luftwaffe could 
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never meet the demands of strategic bombing.  Given the logistics and industrial needs for 
modern warfare, Milch urged Goering to use the Luftwaffe for tactical operations with the aim of 
the destruction of the enemy‟s air forces.   
General Hugo Sperrle was the commander of the Condor Legion in Spain from 
November 1936 until November 1937.  Sperrle learned valuable lessons from the Luftwaffe‟s 
experience there.  He recognized that accidents, weather, and night flying proved to be deadlier 
than the enemy because Germany lost more planes to these circumstances than to the enemy.
22
 
From Spain, Sperrle sent numerous reports on how to improve strategic and tactical bombings.  
He discussed every aspect of operational lessons including weather service, flight training, 
communications, command, and maintenance.  These reports had much to do with the success of 
the Luftwaffe during the first few years of the World War II.
23
   
 The Spanish Civil War was a war of ideas between communism and fascism.  The British 
and Americans, along with the rest of the world, knew of the situation in Spain but remained 
largely indifferent.  Air Marshall Trenchard paid little attention to the Luftwaffe‟s performance 
because he had secured his place as Chief of the Air Staff and remained focused on his own 
theories of strategic bombing.
24
 The United States Army Air Corp made a greater effort to study 
the air war in Spain than Britain, but interest remained minimal.  Henry Arnold, then Assistant 
Chief of the Air Corps, dismissed the air war in Spain as irrelevant to modern war.
25
 
 On September 1
st
, 1939, Germany invaded Poland and World War II began in Europe.  
Hitler ordered that the Luftwaffe be used for tactical purposes as opposed to strategic bombings. 
The Luftwaffe‟s primary objective was to destroy the Polish airfields then aid the ground forces  
in close aerial cover.
26
 On September 3
rd
, Britain and France declared war on Germany.  The 
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United States was neutral, but President Roosevelt issued a statement requesting that all powers 
involved in the conflict avoid the use attacks on civilians as targets of aerial bombardments.
27
 
Chamberlain gladly agreed to Roosevelt‟s proclamation.  At the outbreak of war, the Luftwaffe‟s 
strength was far greater than that of Britain.  During the first month of the war, Germany had 
more fighter and bomber aircraft than Britain, a maritime power whose strength depended on her 
navy.
28
 
 Throughout the Polish campaign, Germany did intentionally bomb civilian targets, 
especially in Warsaw.  The problem was that there was heavy resistance from the Polish army in 
Warsaw.  Germany gave the Polish government an advance warning and demanded surrender 
five times before bombing the city of Warsaw.  The Germans did not consider this a war crime 
because Polish defenders were in operational zones and warnings were given in advance in 
accordance with the Hague Convention.
29
  Germany had never developed any heavy bomber 
aircraft.  The planes that hit Warsaw were modified Ju 52 transport planes carrying incendiary 
bombs that had to be shoveled out of the aircraft.  This made the bombs even more inaccurate 
and resulted in even more civilian casualties.
30
    
 After the Fall of Poland and later Denmark and Norway, Germany turned west for its 
attack on France and the Low Countries.  The attack began May 10, 1940, with stunning success 
in Holland.  However, severely outgunned and outmanned, the Dutch Army hunkered in cities 
and defended quite well, slowing the German advance.  In Rotterdam, Dutch forces had pinned 
down German Paratroopers for days delaying their assault into Belgium and France.
31
 General 
Schmidt, commander of the newly arrived German forces, sent an ultimatum to the Dutch forces 
in Rotterdam.  The ultimatum requested that the forces surrender or be bombed into submission.  
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The Dutch forces eventually agreed to surrender; however, German bombers had been 
dispatched and were already miles from their target in radio silence.  Attempts were made to stop 
the bombers, but the first wave dropped their payload on Rotterdam killing 900 civilians.
32
 The 
other waves were called off but the damage had been done.   
 On May 15
th, 1940, one day after the Rotterdam bombings, Churchill‟s War Cabinet 
authorized bombing raids east of the Rhine.
33
 The bombing of Rotterdam changed the way the 
RAF would conduct its bombing campaign.  Even though Warsaw had been bombed in the 
previous year, Rotterdam, being across the English Channel in Western Europe, hit closer to 
home.  The RAF began bombing raids on German oil plants, steel foundries, and transport links, 
with the stipulation that civilian casualties should be minimized.  RAF bomber command knew 
that civilians would be killed in strategic bombings; however, after Germany demonstrated its 
willingness to bomb civilians, Britain followed suit. 
 On June 25
th
, 1940, France surrendered and Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany.  
This marked a turning point in the RAF‟s priorities.  The RAF‟s two primary roles were to be the 
air defense of the United Kingdom and the strategic bombing offensive against Germany.
34
  The 
Battle of Britain was unique in the fact that the battle was solely reliant on aircraft to break the 
enemies will to resist without the use of armies and navies.
35
 Hitler issued Fuhrer Directive (No. 
16) on preparations for a landing operation against England with the Luftwaffe making the 
preliminary arrangements for the invasion.  The Luftwaffe had the daunting task of preventing 
air attacks, engaging naval vessels, destroying coastal defenses, and breaking the enemy‟s 
resistance for the upcoming land invasion of England, codenamed Operation Sea lion.
36
 
12 
 
 The Battle of Britain began July 10, 1940, with the first phase of the German attack.  It 
was referred to as the Kanalkampf, or Channel Battle.  This was the preliminary phase of the 
attack and a training ground for both sides in which Germany bombed English coastal towns and 
British convoys.  By the end of the month, 180 German aircraft were shot down, 100 of which 
were bombers, while the British lost about seventy fighters.
37
 Hitler, becoming impatient, 
ordered the Luftwaffe to attack radar installations and coastal airfields.  This part of the operation 
was referred to as Adlertag (Eagle Day) and began on August 13.
 
 The attacks on the British 
radar stations were successful in hitting their targets, but the British were able to have their radar 
stations operational again in a matter of hours.  Airfields were damaged but not destroyed.  
Aircraft factories were also heavily damaged, some hit several times in less than a week, killing 
valuable personnel.
38
 German losses still remained higher than Britain, but the Luftwaffe was 
able to replenish its forces quicker than Britain.   
 The final phase of the battle of Britain began on September 7.  Because Britain still 
refused to negotiate peace with Nazi Germany, Hitler ordered that the Luftwaffe once again 
switch its focus to bombing London.  On the first day of the attack, 1,000 Londoners were killed 
by the raids.
39
 As the ferocity of the Luftwaffe‟s attacks increased, the RAF remained determined 
to defend the isle.  After several postponements and mounting losses in the sky, Hitler called off 
plans for the invasion of Britain.  From August 12 until September 30, the Germans lost 1,100 
aircraft and Britain lost 650.
40
 Even though Germany called off plans for an invasion, the 
indiscriminate bombing of civilians and towns continued.   
 The London Blitz was arguably beneficial to Britain overall.  It achieved several 
objectives for Britain and none for Germany.  First, it allowed the RAF to get its second wind.   
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Second, it was a psychological victory in that Nazi Germany was not invincible and Churchill 
wanted America to recognize the importance of that.  Third, it gave the RAF justification to use 
its only offensive weapon, the strategic bomber.
41
 After Germany intentionally killed British 
civilians, the RAF was authorized to use any means necessary to stop the German war machine. 
 The RAF bombed Berlin one day after the Luftwaffe bombed London.  Although the 
material damage was minimal, morale was badly damaged in Germany.  Goering had said that 
the RAF would never bomb the city and he was proven wrong.
42
  Britain made it a point to 
minimize civilian casualties initially, but as Germany disregarded civilian combatants, the RAF 
began to do the same.  In October 1940, Sir Charles Portal was promoted to Chief of the Air 
Staff in Britain.  At the same time Sir Richard Peirse was promoted to head of Bomber 
Command.
43
 Throughout the rest of 1940 and 1941, Britain launched raids against Germany.  
Due to Britain‟s insufficient funds and minimal American involvement, raids in Germany were 
met with limited if any real success.  Losses were high, sometimes as much as 12.5 percent.
44
 
 1941 proved to be a crucial year for Britain‟s involvement in World War II.  In the 
summer Hitler launched his offensive against the Soviet Union, devoting most of his war effort 
toward the Eastern Front.  In December, the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, 
giving America ample reason to fully mobilize its economy toward war production.  The USA 
had been lightly involved in the Battle of Britain, but with an official declaration of war, the 
bombing campaign against Germany would have no limit. In February 1942, Peirse was relieved 
of his duties at Bomber Command.  Sir Arthur Harris assumed role of Bomber Command and in 
the same month the American 8
th
 Air Force began arriving in Britain.  The nature of the air war 
was about to change significantly.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 EFFECTIVENESS 
 The effectiveness of the Allied Bombing Campaign has been debated by historians for 
decades.  Obviously, in the years of 1940 and 1941, the RAF had a difficult fight against 
Germany.  In fact, the RAF dropped only 62,000 tons of bombs on Germany in 1940 and 1941 
compared with the 676,000 tons that were dropped in 1944 alone.
45
  However, 1942 was a 
pivotal year for the Allies.  Historian Alan Levine believes that the attacks conducted by the 
RAF prior to 1942 were failures.
46
  With Harris assuming control of Bomber Command and the 
8
th
 Air Force arriving in Britain, Bomber Command was reformed.  A policy of “area attack” 
would be implemented, meaning that the primary objective would be to attack “the morale of the 
enemy‟s civil population and in particular, the industrial workers.”47  The British also upgraded 
their planes to Avro Lancaster bombers capable of carrying a massive bomb load of over five 
tons, twice that of the American bombers. Some modified Lancasters could carry an eleven ton 
bomb for special missions.
48
 To go along with the new weapons came new electronic guidance 
systems to make the RAF‟s attacks more accurate and effective.49 
As the 8
th
 Air Force was preparing itself for the invasion of North Africa, Britain 
continued to carry out bombing missions against Germany on its own.  With Bomber Command 
restructured, the RAF was ready to implement new ideas into the bombing campaign. In March 
1942 Winston Churchill‟s scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell, concluded that one ton of bombs 
made 100–200 people in Germany homeless.  The idea was to conduct raids destroying 
Germany‟s factories and surrounding residential areas.  Such devastating attacks would force 
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Germany to reallocate resources, overwhelm the civilian sector, and eventually destroy the 
German war machine.
50
 
“On the night of March 29-30”, Harris wrote, “The first German city went up in 
flames.”51  The RAF had mustered 234 bombers to attack Lubeck with incendiary bombs, 191 of 
these bombers hit their target.  Controversial author, A.C. Grayling, argues that the RAF was 
able to kill 1,000 civilians, destroy seventy percent of the city, and justify its actions by saying 
the raid was to destroy the Heinkel factory in the city‟s southern suburbs.52 He also argues that it 
was this action that provoked Germany into launching Luftwaffe raids into England, bombing its 
civilian populations, which would lead into even larger retaliatory attacks against Germany by 
the RAF.  It was these attacks that would lead Harris to implement a weapon he felt would 
destroy Germany and prove the strategic bomber‟s importance, the 1,000 plane raid. 
 The first 1,000 plane raid was launched on May 31, 1942, consisting of no less than 
1,050 bombers taking off from fifty-five separate air fields.
53
 Historian Charles Messenger writes 
that the bombers were met with fairly light anti-aircraft fire; in fact after the raid was over, only 
forty aircraft were missing, while 890 claimed to have hit their targets.  Even Winston Churchill 
and General Hap Arnold were impressed with the results of the bombings, each sending a 
personal letter of congratulations to Harris on a sound victory.
54
  In less than seventy-five 
minutes, 2,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Cologne, destroying 600 acres, 13,000 
buildings, but surprisingly only killing 469 people.
55
 
The attack on Cologne was considered a success by the British and the thousand bomber 
raid proved to be a powerful tool in their arsenal.  However, given the sheer magnitude of the 
raid and American involvement in North Africa, the RAF was only able to conduct two more 
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large attacks in the summer of 1942.  The raids were on Essen and Bremen, and due to poor 
weather conditions, produced meager results.
56
 Harris wanted to conduct four separate 1,000 
plane raids a month, but given the logistics of the raids, the RAF would have to wait until the 
Americans could devote more time and resources to a combined bomber offensive. 
The 8
th
 Air Force had begun arriving in Britain in early 1942 under the command of 
Major General Carl Spaatz.  The buildup of the American Air Force in Britain was a gradual 
process throughout the first months of 1942.  The initial use of the air force was to provide 
tactical cover to America‟s army offensive in North Africa.57  By the summer of 1942, combined 
bombing operations against Germany were finally ready to get underway.  The B-17 was the 
bomber of choice for the Americans.  It had a lighter payload than the Lancaster, typically 
around 6,000 pounds, but carried thirteen heavy caliber machine guns.
58
 The first major raids 
took place on August 17, 1942, led by Col. Paul Tibbets, later the pilot of the Enola Gay. The 
raid consisted of eighteen B-17 bombers striking the marshalling yards at Rouen in North-West 
France.
59
  The raid took place during the day using the new Norden Bombsight to increase 
accuracy.  Under RAF Spitfire escort, the bombers hit Rouen with little success; however, this 
raid marked a milestone in the bombing campaign.  For the first time, the United States and 
Great Britain worked together to bomb a German infrastructure that was producing war goods.   
The fall and winter months of 1942 were slow for the combined bomber offensive.  The 
majority of RAF and USAAF forces were being used in support of Operation Torch in North 
Africa.
60
 Late historian Robin Neillands writes that throughout 1942, Chief of the Air Staff, 
Charles Portal, called for a rapid buildup of an Allied Bomber force.  His proposal was a 
combined force of 3,000 bombers to be ready by the end of 1943 and between 4,000 and 6,000 in 
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1944.  With a force that large the Allies could drop 95,000 tons of explosives every month.
61
  
The 8
th
 Air Force was joined by other units throughout the fall of 1942 but could rarely muster 
more than 100 aircraft for any mission.
62
 
The Casablanca Conference was the turning point for the Allied bombing campaign.  It 
took place at the beginning of 1943 and one subject that was discussed was the issue of a 
combined bomber offensive.   Historian Roger Beaumont writes that at this point in the war it 
was becoming clear that Germany could not win the war.  However, the Soviet Union was 
putting pressure on the Allies to open up a second front in the West because the Soviets lost 
about a division per day in 1942.
63
 Operation POINTBLANK was the name given to the 
Combined Bomber Offensive.  The offensive intended, “round the clock bombing”, which meant 
the RAF would bomb by night and the USAAF by day.  The main objective was “The 
progressive destruction of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the 
undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their armed resistance is 
fatally weakened.”64 The initial priorities were;                                                                                                                        
a)  German submarine construction yards                                                                                        
b)  The German aircraft industry                                                                                                     
c)  Transportation                                                                                                                              
d)  Oil Plants                                                                                                                                      
e)  Other targets in the enemy war industry.
65
 
The German U-Boat menace had taken a toll on Allied shipping, especially late in 1942 
and early 1943.  Plans for an invasion of continental Europe could not take place until the 
Atlantic was free of U-Boats.  In March 1943 alone, U-Boats sank 500,000 tons of shipping.
66
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Long range bombers equipped with radar were called into action.  Allied bombers and naval craft 
managed to subdue the U-Boat threat in a matter of months, before the Combined Bomber 
Offensive commenced.
67
 When the Combined Bomber Offensive was begun on June 10, 1943, 
German submarines were no longer a threat and the priorities switched to German aircraft and 
ball bearing industries.
68
 
In the weeks following the Casablanca Conference, the Allied Air Forces began gaining 
experience.  Harris began sending bombers to hit industrial targets in the Ruhr pocket.  The first 
city to be hit in the Ruhr was Essen.  Essen was hit several times over the course of a month and 
half.  The last attack was so devastating that the Germans reported “total” gas works damage.69  
The next sizeable attack was Duisburg, which received 5,157 tons of bombs over the course of 
five raids.
70
  One of the most remarkable attacks was delivered on Wuppertal-Barman, in which 
ninety percent of the buildup area attacked was destroyed, leaving 2,450 dead and 118,000 
homeless.
71
  On June 24 and 25, 630 bombers hit Elbefeld, killing 1,800 people.  A week later, 
Cologne was hit with a similar sized force, killing 4,400 people.  Author A.C. Grayling writes 
that this is proof of Bomber Command‟s increasing attack power because the smaller raid did 
more damage than the previous year‟s 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne.  Five days later, Cologne 
was hit again, leaving a combined total of 350,000 Germans without homes.
72
 By the end of 
June, the RAF alone had dropped 34,705 tons of bombs on the Ruhr area with the loss of 628 
aircraft, totals that do not include minor combat operations.
73
 
“Operation Gomorrah” was the code name for the Allied bombing of Hamburg.  The 
British were to attack by night during the last week of July and first week of August, while the 
American forces would bomb during the day on July 25 and 26.
74
 The attacks began on July 24 
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by the RAF and the 25th by the Americans.  The majority of bombs used were incendiary bombs 
designed to create small fires that would spread causing a firestorm.  The Allied attack was 
relentless and brutal.  The RAF attacks were far more inaccurate than the Americans, hitting 
mostly civilian areas.
75
 Over half of the city was reduced to rubble, with roughly 30,480 
buildings completely destroyed.  There is no way of knowing how many died, estimates vary 
between 60,000 and 100,000, while 45,000 corpses were found in the ruins of the bombings.
76
 
The attack on Hamburg devastated German morale and Hitler himself thought that similar 
attacks would force Germany out of the war.
77
 The attacks were only the first of sixty-nine raids 
that the allies would launch against Hamburg alone. 
The attacks on Hamburg were regarded as a success by the Allies.  On August 1, 1943, 
the Allies‟ luck began to change.  Operation Tidal Wave was an exclusive AAF operation 
involving the 8
th
 and 9
th
 Air Forces flying into occupied Romania to hit oil fields deep inside 
enemy territory.  The American attacks came with disastrous results.  According to historian 
Kenneth Werrel, many of the pilots were inexperienced and used to flying over the friendly, 
cloudless skies of Texas; not cloudy, hostile territory.
78
  The American forces also encountered 
the same problems that the RAF and Luftwaffe had during their daylight raids, which proved 
costly in casualties and had limited effectiveness.   Of the 178 B-24s involved in the Raid, 54 
were lost.
79
 The low level attacks were highly ineffective.  Oil production eventually resumed as 
normal and success of the attacks was questionable.
80
   
Following the costly attacks on the oil fields in Ploesti, the American forces turned to the 
Luftwaffe‟s aircraft industry for the next mission. The Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission was to 
be a two-part strike that was supposed to cripple Germany‟s aircraft industry.  The mission was a 
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combined effort by the Americans and British which began on August 17, 1943.
81
 The plan was 
for 375 bombers to raid factories in two cities at once, then follow up with another two-part 
strike shortly after.  In Schweinfurt alone, 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on factories with 
devastating results.  After the war, Albert Speer, German Minister of Armaments, admitted that 
the raids were so costly September aircraft production was 35% of the preraid level.
82
 Bomber 
crews and escorts shot down forty-seven German planes during the raid.  Regensburg had similar 
bombing results as Schweinfurt, but with the success came a price.  Of the attacking bombers, 
sixty were lost, and eleven more were scrapped.  Over 600 men were either killed, missing, 
evading capture, or captured as a result of the raid, along with severe damage to numerous 
bombers.
83
 The raids left the bomber crews and planes so badly damaged that the follow up 
mission would have to wait. 
While the USAAF was recovering from the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid, the RAF 
continued smaller raids throughout August and September, with the Luftwaffe refusing to give 
up air space to the allies.  On the RAF‟s mission to Nuremburg on the night of August 27/28, the 
RAF lost thirty-three out of 674 bombers and three days later in Munchen-Gladbach, twenty-five 
out of 660 bombers were lost.
84
  Harris began sending small missions into Berlin to hit aircraft 
industries along with residential areas.  On the night of September 1, the RAF lost forty-seven 
out of 612 aircraft and three days later, twenty-two out of 316 bombers were lost.
85
 Germany‟s 
aircraft production of the Me-109 dropped from 725 in July to 536 in September.  Additionally,  
Luftwaffe losses in the sky were mounting, so Germany developed more elaborate ways of 
manufacturing planes and engines to increase production to counter mounting losses by strategic 
bombings and air defenses.
86
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Once the Allies had recovered from the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid, General Curtis 
LeMay and other allied commanders wanted to deliver another damaging raid to Germany, this 
time to the ball bearing factories.  The 291 B-17s took off on October 14 with Spitfire escort.  
The Germans had learned the limited range of the Spitfires and waited until the bombers were 
alone without escort and launched well executed strikes on the American formations.  Historian 
Tami Biddle notes that 198 bombers were either shot down or crippled.
87
  This event would later 
be known as “Black Thursday.”88  This eye opening attack proved to American commanders that 
no matter how well armed the bombers were, they were no match for the Luftwaffe‟s fighter 
planes.
89
 The attacks were not highly effective, especially at the price paid by American bomber 
crews.  The USAAF decided to temporarily suspend all further deep penetration missions 
because losses of that magnitude were unacceptable.
90
 Arthur Harris condemned the attacks, 
stating that the Americans needed to give up their “disastrous diversions” and help the RAF in 
bombing Berlin.
91
   
Arthur Harris felt the key to defeating the Germans was to destroy Berlin, thus crumbling 
Berlin‟s industry and economy and decimating the morale of Berliners. “The Battle of Berlin”, as 
Harris referred to it, began on the night of November 18.
92
 By this time in the war, Harris had a 
daily average of 800 bombers at his disposal, allowing him to create diversionary attacks to stir 
confusion among the Luftwaffe.  In a memo sent to Churchill, Harris wrote, “We can wreck 
Berlin from end to end…..it will cost us between 400-500 aircraft.  It will cost Germany the                    
war.”93 From November until March 1944, the RAF conducted heavy attacks on the German 
capital.  In the first two nights alone 9,000 Berliners were killed, but the RAF suffered heavy 
casualties.
94
 Six thousand acres of Berlin had been damaged, but no matter how much damage 
the RAF inflicted upon Berlin, the city would not burn into a firestorm. Berlin was too spread out 
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and the Berliners were too resistant and would rebuild and nullify much of what the RAF had 
done.  Harris had underestimated the will of the Germans to resist aerial attacks. 
Historian Kenneth Werrell believes that if the war had ended late in 1943, the evidence 
would have supported the view that strategic bombing had failed.
95
 He suggests that the prewar 
theories and practices had been disproven.  The first assumption that the bomber would always 
get through was incorrect.  Introduction of radar gave defenders an advantage by knowing where 
the enemy was and fighter planes were far superior in aerial combat to the bomber.  Secondly, 
industrial targets could be hit and damaged but could rarely be put out of commission entirely.  
German workers found ways of adapting to the damaged bombings and production actually 
began increasing as the German economy began to mobilize fully for total war.  Lastly, 
intelligence became a problem when bomber crews would release their payload on a target and 
claim the target as destroyed.  In all actuality, few targets were ever completely destroyed prior 
to 1944 because only 22% of bombs actually fell within five miles of their intended targets.
96
 
During the months following, “Black Thursday”, the Allies began rethinking their 
strategy for bombing missions into Germany.  Historian Richard Overy believes that several 
important changes helped turn the tide of war in favor of the Allies.  First, they developed a new 
P-51 Mustang with an external, detachable fuel tank that would allow the fighters to protect the 
bombers from takeoff until landing.  The Mustangs were better suited to dogfight with the                
Luftwaffe‟s Me-109s than the bombers were, thus allowing more bombers to get through to 
deliver their payloads.
97
 The Allies, especially the RAF, began using more incendiary bombs 
rather than high explosive bombs to ensure the maximum amount of damage that could be 
delivered per sortie.
98
 Finally, by the end of 1943, the Allied war production was at unheard of 
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levels.  In 1942, Britain and America produced 18,880 bombers, but by the end of 1943 that 
number had nearly doubled to 37,083.  As the bomber production increased, so did the bombs.  
In 1942, the Allies dropped 53,755 tons of bombs on Axis controlled Europe and by 1943, that 
figure had increased to 226,513.
99
 During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the Allied 
leaders had called for a round the clock bombing of Germany.  After a year of waiting, Harris 
and Spaatz could finally make the Combined Bomber Offensive possible.    
 On January 1, 1944, General Carl Spaatz became commander of the newly established 
USSTAF (United States Strategic Air Force) consisting of 8
th
 and 15
th
 Air Forces with some 
authority over the 9
th
 Air Force.
100
  The Americans returned to the skies with a spectacular 
vengeance. “The Big Week” began on February 20th with the 8th Air Force launching thousands 
of bombers against a dozen airplane factories in Germany with escorts following the entire 
mission all week long.  In Leipzig, Me-109 factories accounted for 32% of all Me-109 
production during the war.
101
  The factories withstood the RAF‟s attacks but the American 
saturation bombings proved too much. Over 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped on German 
aircraft factories; 90% of the Luftwaffe‟s total industry.102 The Allies lost about 300 bombers but 
the Germans paid dearly for the raids.  Over 700 Me-109s had been destroyed in the air or in 
factories, almost all twin engine fighters were gone, production of Ju 88s was cut by 50%, and 
75% of the factories had been damaged or destroyed.
103
 The Big Week marked a turning point in 
the air war.  America became the power in the air, outnumbering RAF and Bomber Command 
and Britain would also take a more subordinate role in the Allied Order of Battle.   
 The German Luftwaffe was the last barrier to the Allied invasion of Europe.  Throughout 
the months of March and April, vicious aerial combat was fought between the Luftwaffe and the 
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fighters escorting the bombers.  Historian Alan Levine argues that it was not bombers hitting the 
factories that gained air supremacy; it was the loss of experienced Luftwaffe pilots during these 
missions that cost the Luftwaffe dearly.  In March 1944, the Luftwaffe lost 511 pilots killed, 
roughly 21.7% of their available force; most were veterans.  In April, another 447 pilots were 
killed, eliminating another 20.1% of its force.
104
 By the end of April, the Luftwaffe had ceased to 
be effective and the Allies had clear control of the skies.   
 On April 1, 1944, General Eisenhower declared that all allied air force priorities were to 
focus on one common objective, Operation OVERLORD.  The combined bomber offensive 
would temporarily be suspended and Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder would serve as Deputy 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Air Forces in preparation for D-Day.
105
 All aircraft would be 
used to support the beach landings by eliminating the remaining Luftwaffe, disrupting 
transportation, damaging oil production, and weakening beach defenses.
106
 With the Luftwaffe  
posing virtually no threat to the landings, the Allies began focusing on the tedious task of 
prepping the Normandy area for the largest amphibious invasion in human history.  
The Allies began bombing Germany‟s oil refineries again in April.  The attacks were 
devastating to the German war machine.  Production from every major synthetic plant steadily 
decreased as attacks became more frequent with no Luftwaffe aircraft to defend the plants.      
These plants were producing 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began in late April. The 
production rate fell to 107,000 tons by June.  Aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped 
from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons by June.
107
 The attacks were so frequent that the 
workers engaged in rebuilding these plants would say, “Today we finished rebuilding the plants 
and tomorrow the bombers will come again.”108 
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During the bombings of German transportation lines, 71,000 tons of bombs were dropped 
on rail centers by bombers and modified P-51 fighters.  Forty-one out of eighty rail centers were 
declared useless for German reinforcement.
109
 By the end of the Normandy preparation, only two 
bridges over the Seine River below Paris remained intact.  After the invasion on June 6, 1944, it 
took the German 275
th
 division a week to travel 150 miles from Fougeres to the front lines.  Two 
Panzer Divisions made it from Poland to France in less time than it took them to travel from 
Eastern France to Normandy.  Many other personnel could not make it to the German front lines 
until July 3, nearly one month later.
110
 The Luftwaffe was so badly damaged that it could only 
muster 80 operational aircraft to oppose the American forces on D-Day.
111
 The air power used 
for the initial landings at Normandy had helped make the invasion a success and the Americans 
had officially opened up the much anticipated Western Front. 
Throughout the summer of 1944, the USSTAF and RAF were being used primarily for 
tactical missions in support of land units in the West.  The first large scale bombing in support of 
ground troops in Normandy was at Cherbourg on June 22 from the 9
th
 Air Force.  The confusion 
of the battle and heavy smoke and debris caused serious problems for the bombers, many bombs 
fell short hitting friendly targets and missing most of the Germans providing no breakthrough for 
the land units.
112
 A month later the 8
th
 Air Force encountered a similar problem while trying to 
help land units break through at St. Lo, hitting several friendly battalions by mistake.  The RAF 
made the same error at Caen a week earlier as well.
113
 Both General Spaatz and Air Marshall 
Harris disagreed with using bombers for such close tactical support, realizing the bombers true 
potential was strategic strikes, not tactical.
114
 However, toward the end of the Normandy 
campaign, tactical bombers had better success in support of armored units, especially Patton‟s 
Third Army.
115
 
26 
 
As early as 1941, American commanders wanted strategic bombing to be aimed at 
precision targets while the RAF and Harris firmly believed morale bombing would win the war.  
Many in the USAAF wanted to show that precise strategic bombing could help win the war with 
fewer civilian casualties. This would help guarantee an independent Air Force established after 
the war.
116As Arnold told Eaker in 1943, “We want the people to understand and have faith in 
our way of making war.”117 However, in August 1944, the Allies were stalled on the Western 
Front.  On August 28, Eisenhower told General Spaatz, “While I have always insisted that the 
U.S. Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets, I am always prepared to take part 
in anything that gives real promise to ending the war quickly.”118 The bombing campaign of 
Germany was ready to reach new levels of destruction on an unimaginable scale. 
In mid-September, General Eisenhower returned control of the Allied air forces to the 
newly combined Bomber Command. The Allies now had the capacity to destroy any city they 
wanted, and that is exactly what the bombers achieved.  In fact, 72% of all bombs dropped on 
Germany fell after July 1, 1944
119
. Targeted cities were ones that were producing some sort of 
war material. The new order of operations were:                                                                            
1) Oil                                                                                                                                                  
2) Transportation                                                                                                                                   
3) Tank production and ordnance depots                                                                                              
If weather or tactical conditions made these targets unsuitable, industrial areas were to attacked 
using blind bombing techniques as necessary.
120
 
Oil was possibly the most important factor to the German war machine.  Without it, 
armies could not efficiently operate.  The RAF and USSTAF had been attacking refineries for 
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months, but with strategic operations back underway the Allies knew that the knockout blow to 
the German oil supply was possible. One of the most productive synthetic oil plants was Leuna.  
The heavily guarded plant was hit twenty-two times by the Allies in eight months.  Each time the 
plant‟s production dropped and the plant had to be rebuilt to meet Germany‟s demand for oil.  
6,552 sorties were flown against the plant dropping a total of 18,328 tons of bombs on the 
factory.  Comparing production preraid and postraid, the plant's production was reduced by 
91%.
121
 German fuel production decreased quickly as the Allies bombed plants in Budapest, 
Bremen, and Odertal.
122
  Nitrogen and methanol production relied for their syntheses process on 
synthetic oil as well.  Nitrogen production fell from 75,000 tons in early 1944 to 20,000 tons by 
the end of the year.
123
  Rubber was also synthesized in refineries relying on oil.  When the oil 
production fell in the summer/fall 1944, rubber production dropped drastically.  The preraid level 
of rubber production was 12,000 tons a month, but by the end of 1944 synthetic rubber 
production was operating at 2,000 tons a month.  Although oil production rose to 337,000 tons in 
November, much of the oil was reserved for the upcoming German offensive in the West in 
December.
124
 The Battle of the Bulge was Germany‟s last desperate gamble to force the Western 
Allies into negotiations or at least buy more time against the invading Soviets from the East.  The 
attack failed, due mainly to a lack of fuel supply.
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On November 1, Spaatz and others agreed to drop tank production from the initial list of 
targets. The German transportation systems would take precedent instead.  The success of the 
Normandy campaign led Harris and others to believe that disrupting the flow of goods and 
resources throughout the Reich would further hinder the German‟s war efforts.  The Allies 
dropped 35,000 tons of bombs on the German railways alone.
126
 During the months of 
September and October, the German transportation system began collapsing under the weight of 
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Allied bombing attacks.  Freight car loadings went from 900,000 cars per week during the last 
week of August 1944 to less than 500,000 per week in December.
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With the destruction of the German railways underway, the Allies began bombing canals 
and waterways to disrupt transportation by canals and rivers.  On November 2, 172 B-24s 
damaged the Beilefeld Viaduct so badly it closed for nine days.  More B-24s hit the target again, 
closing the viaduct for eleven more days.  On the same day, 144 B-24s hit the Altenbecken 
Viaduct so badly it shut down until February.
128
 One-hundred fifty-seven B-24s bombed the 
Mittelland Canal so badly that it was shut down for the remainder of the war.  Coal movement by 
waterway systems fell from 2.2 million tons in August to 454,000 tons in November.
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After the success of the attacks against German oil and transportation, secondary targets 
began to feel the effects of Allied bombs as well.  In the last half of 1944, the German truck 
industry was attacked.  One attack on Opel in Brandenburg was so devastating that it knocked 
the factory out of commission indefinitely.  Daimler Benz was hit multiple times but not 
completely destroyed.  By December, truck production was 35% of the average for the first half 
of 1944.
130
 The Germans tried to rebuild new shipping yards, but Allied bombs would hit targets 
while they were being built and five of Germany‟s major shipping yards had to be closed for the 
remainder of the war.
131
 Ironically, after switching bombing priorities, tank production increased 
from 1,600 tanks in August to 1,800 in December.
132
 The problem was that without oil and 
transportation, German tanks became nothing more than stationary targets for Allied planes. 
1945 proved to be the pivotal year in the total destruction of German cities.  Civilian 
targets would take the brunt of the city bombings.  The main objective was to break the will of 
the civilians to continue to wage war.  Ever since the Ardennes Offensive, the Germans were 
29 
 
showing no sign of surrender.  Priorities switched again.  Oil remained a top priority, but heavily 
populated civilian cities would be targeted to cause great confusion among the populace and 
hamper reinforcements.
133
 Harris was thrilled with this because by 1945, the Allied bomber force 
had reached the peak of its power.  Over the next four months, over 180,000 tons of bombs 
would be dropped against poorly defended cities.
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Berlin was one of the first cities that Harris wanted to bomb into the ground.  General 
Doolittle was opposed to beating an enemy who was already in ruins, but after some hesitation, 
General Spaatz carried out the attack anyway.
135
 Codenamed Operation THUNDERCLAP, the 
raid took place on February 3
rd
, 1945, with nearly a thousand B - 17s committed to the bombing. 
The initial raid killed about 2,500 people and left 120,000 homeless. American bombers flew 
nearly unopposed and dropped an accurate payload on the defeated city numerous times 
throughout the month of February until the Red Army was close enough for the raids to be called 
off.  Total estimates of the death toll from Allied bombs are around 25,000 civilians, with around 
6,000 acres of city destroyed.
136
   
One of the most controversial topics in World War II is the bombing of Dresden.  
Dresden had been relatively unscathed by the bombings, except for a small attack in October, 
1944.  Many refugees had made their way to Dresden and it was almost an entirely civilian 
population, including 20,000 POWs.  Most of the city was made of wood and therefore was very 
flammable. 
137
  On February 13, the British hit the city first, with over 700 bombers, the next day 
the Americans followed up with 400 more.  The majority of bombs dropped on Dresden were 
250,000 incendiary sticks.
138
  A firestorm erupted and the city became a blazing inferno, 
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destroying 13 square miles.  Estimates vary for the total killed by the bombings, the most 
accurate probably being around 35,000.
139
    
 Operation CLARION was the Allied plan of breaking the enemy‟s morale by destroying 
what was left of Germany‟s infrastructure.  The attacks turned cities and towns that were already 
damaged into ruins. What little transportation that existed in Germany was further damaged.
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When the refugees of Berlin evacuated to other cities like Munich, Chief of Staff Marshall 
ordered Munich be bombed too, in a display of power showing the Germans there was no 
hope.
141
 Almost no town or city in Germany was spared.  Larger cities were hit multiple times.  
Author A.C. Grayling describes the multiple attacks on Cologne in which over 2,000 bombers hit           
the city so many times in three days that it turned rubble into powder.
142
 By the final raid on 
Cologne, 2,000 acres of the city were destroyed.
143
  On March 15, 1945, Speer addressed a report 
to Hitler in which he stated, “The German economy is heading for inevitable collapse within 4-8 
weeks.”144 Four days later, Hitler ordered a scorched earth policy on the Western Front, but few 
followed orders.  By the beginning of April, the RAF ceased area bombings because much of 
Germany had been destroyed.
145
 On April 16, 1945, Spaatz declared the strategic air war in 
Germany over.
146
 
 In terms of effectiveness, the strategic bombing campaign of Germany can be considered 
both a success and a failure.  The campaign was a failure in the sense that the bombings did not 
live up to prewar expectations by the aviation theorists who believed the war could be won by 
bombing alone.  Secondly, the bombs dropped on Germany were terribly inaccurate, with few 
hitting their exact mark.  Third, the bombings of civilians in order to break their morale did not 
work.  In fact, it angered the populace, possibly explaining why the Germans continued to fight 
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on for months, even as it became increasingly obvious that the Germans were going to lose the 
war.  Fourth, the destruction left in the wake of the bombings made it difficult and slow for the 
German people‟s reconstruction effort following the war.  The damage caused by the bombings 
destroyed everything that made Germany a “nation state”.  Lastly, the death toll from the 
bombing campaign was staggering. Somewhere around 600,000 German civilians were killed, 
70,000 of whom were children.  Combined Allied casualties reach somewhere around 
140,000.
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  The successes of the strategic bombing of Germany should be recognized as well.  Its 
greatest achievement was probably the destruction of the Luftwaffe, which would have made 
numerous sea and land operations impossible had the Luftwaffe retained controls of the skies 
over Europe.  Another very important achievement was that the Combined Bomber Offensive 
opened up a second front of the war.  The Soviet losses on the Eastern front were so severe 
during the war that resources diverted by the bomber offensive from the Eastern front proved 
vital to the survival of the Soviet Union.  Historian Roger Beaumont writes that by 1944, 
800,000 Germans were engaged in the air defenses against the Allies.  To go with that was 
14,000 heavy and 40,000 light anti-aircraft guns.  Another one million Luftwaffe troops were on 
cleanup duty and hundreds of thousands civilians were involved in the rebuilding process, plus 
the Germans transferred the bulk of the fighter force back to Germany.
148
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CHAPTER 3  
MORALITY 
 Richard Preston, historian at Duke University, describes Total War in the most complete 
sense as, “fighting with all resources and all kinds of weapons without any restrictions imposed 
by humanity or by expediency, killing all prisoners and civilians without respect for age or sex, 
disregarding completely the rights of neutrals, and using psychological techniques to wipe out 
individual personality and to obliterate all standards.”149 Military philosopher, Carl Von 
Clausewitz, claimed that total war of this nature existed only in theory.  Although Clausewitz 
never mentioned the term, “total war”, he did write, “Absolute totality in warfare could only 
mean chaos and a return to barbarism.”150 Given the definition of total war, Nazi Germany is the 
closest an industrialized nation has come to total war. 
  When questioning the morality of the Allied bombing campaign, it is important to 
remember that it was the Nazis who first implemented indiscriminate bombings of civilians 
during World War II.  During the invasion of Poland in 1939, it was the Luftwaffe that attacked 
industrial sections in Polish cities, most notably Warsaw
151
.  Neville Chamberlain reacted to this 
by addressing the House of Commons, stating the British government would never permit the 
bombing of women, children, and civilians for terroristic purposes.
152
 The problem was the 
Rotterdam attacks of May 15 and the London attacks on August 24, 1940, that struck a nerve 
with the British.
153
 Both attacks were accidental to an extent.  The Rotterdam attacks were meant 
to be called off at the last minute and the London attacks were navigational errors.
154
  However, 
because Nazi Germany drew the first blood on civilians and Chamberlain was no longer in 
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office, Britain immediately followed up with similar attacks with little regard for civilian 
casualties. 
 The British concept of strategic bombing differed from that of the Americans.  During 
1940 and 1941, Britain suffered a series of bombings and attacks on its civilian populace.  The 
Germans made no distinction between combatant and noncombatants and began bombing 
London by day and night.  The Germans were hoping the attacks would break the morale of the 
British people; instead, it had the opposite effect.  Most citizens who lived in rural areas were 
intrigued by the air war.
155
 During the daylight raids, many British citizens enjoyed watching a 
good dogfight during an afternoon picnic or luncheon at a friend‟s house.156 Many damaged 
planes made emergency landings near or on golf courses due to favorable landing conditions, 
with bystanders giving beer to British pilots who made it out of the damaged planes. If the pilot 
who made it out alive was German, people would run from all directions, eager to give the 
downed pilot a hostile reception.
157
  
As Luftwaffe losses mounted during daylight raids, the Germans started intensifying their 
attacks and began bombing cities at night, making it more difficult for the British air defenses to 
hit their targets.  More importantly, night time bombings were horribly inaccurate and caused 
great damage to suburban areas of cities, housing mostly civilians of importance.
158
 Many began 
questioning the motives of the Germans, calling these attacks, “terror bombings”.  During 
October 1940, the Luftwaffe launched numerous attacks nearly every night, killing hundreds of 
men, women, and children per mission.
159
  The German attacks grew more intense every night, 
killing more civilians.  The attacks culminated in December when on one attack in London 3,000 
civilians were killed.  Instead of frightening the Londoners, the attacks caused anger toward 
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Germany. When Churchill visited the ruined homes, people cheered, shouting for Churchill to 
send bombers back to Germany.
160
  Civilian morale did not break, the British economy did not 
collapse, and war production actually increased.
161
 As Luftwaffe casualties mounted, Hitler 
decided not to waste his resources on the Battle of Britain and instead turned to the East for his 
upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. 
Historian Michael Bess believes that it was the terror attacks on British civilians that 
helped gain support for the RAF‟s area bombings in Germany.  The leadership in Britain 
continued to insist that the RAF aim their bombs at military targets but frankly admitted that 
bombing operations would take considerable toll on the enemy noncombatants.
162
 Like the 
Luftwaffe, the RAF began conducting daylight bombing raids from 1940 through early 1941.  
Bess believes that two facts were becoming painfully obvious to the RAF.  First, just like the 
Luftwaffe, daylight operations produced unacceptable losses in aircraft and personnel.  Second, 
and again similarly to the Luftwaffe‟s experience, the bombings were horribly inaccurate and 
had minimal results.
163
 While the initial goal of the RAF was to hit precise targets like factories, 
bridges, and munitions plants, night time area bombings were the safest way to achieve the most 
damage to a target.  
When America entered the air war in early 1942, the AAF had its own war plan for 
strategic bombing.  The plan was similar to that of Britain in that American bombers would hit 
precise targets during daylight raids because precision bombsights only worked if the target 
could be seen, and even then it was still inaccurate.
164
 However, both Commander of the 
USAAF, Henry Arnold, and General of the USAAF, Ira Eaker, knew as early as 1941 that once 
bombers became more abundant and German industry began to crumble, bombers could be used 
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to break the noncombatant morale if necessary.
165
 The problem with the AAF‟s war plan was 
exactly what the RAF and Luftwaffe had learned from personal experience.  Daylight raids left 
the bombers vulnerable to flak and especially enemy fighters.  Regardless of these difficulties, 
the USSAF combined with the RAF began their bomber offensive.   
The bombs used by the Allies were designed to create as much damage as possible.  The 
preparatory task of a raid usually started off with a blockbuster heavy bomb.  The bomb weighed 
about 4,000 pounds and could level an entire block of apartments.  The blast wave was strong 
enough to compress the surrounding air into a massive shock wave that could rip roofs off of 
buildings and shatter windows.  The RAF dropped 68,000 of these during the war.
166
 The 
medium bombs were typically used to hit railroads, canals, viaducts, and concrete constructions.  
These usually weighed about 500 pounds and were fragmentation bombs.  The Allies dropped 
about 750,000 of these during the war.
167
 The general purpose anti-personnel bombs were high 
explosive shrapnel bombs, not typically preferred by bomber crews because they were usually 
aimed at trenches or army groups.  800,000 of these were dropped by the end of the war.
168
 The 
favorite weapon of the RAF was the cluster bomb, which would release dozens of smaller two-
pound incendiary devices.  Millions of these sticks would be dropped all over Germany 
throughout the war.  The thermite and magnesium mixture that when dropped in large enough 
quantities would ignite small fires that would cause larger more damaging fires.
169
 
 The first large scale display of destructive fire power occurred on May 30, 1942, during 
Operation MILLENNIUM, the 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne.  Author A.C. Grayling says the 
damage done to human life in Cologne was minimal given the grand scale of the bomber fleet.  
13,000 buildings were destroyed, 45,000 Germans were left homeless, but only 469 people were                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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killed.
170
  From a moral standpoint, this raid seemed to follow the guidelines of humane warfare, 
by which the buildings, industry, factories, and housing developments take the damage while the 
civilian casualties remained low.    
Grayling writes that there were several reasons the body count was so low in the 1942 
raid.  First, of the 2,500 tons of explosives dropped on Cologne most were not incendiaries.  
Second, the raid was conducted over the course of seventy-five minutes, giving the Germans 
ample time to put out the fires and start repairing immediately afterwards.  Last, by May, the city 
had constructed public shelters for 75,000 people, 7,500 bunkers, and 42,000 air raid shelters.
171
  
This was typical for most cities in Germany, which is why body counts remained relatively low 
and structural damage medium throughout 1941, 1942, and into 1943.   
Nuremberg was another example of the Allies‟ attempt at relatively humane warfare with 
the bombing campaign. Historian Neil Gregor writes that Nuremberg was a major industrial 
center as well as the center of the annual party rallies.  During 1941, sporadic raids on the city 
caused some industrial damage but almost no cost to human life.
172
 The raids slightly increased 
in 1942, killing around one hundred people, but morale was never really affected and most 
Nuremberg residents went about business as usual.  The attacks were even viewed as a necessary 
part of war by many Germans who understood that bombers would attack their war production 
industry.  The city authorities were able to cope with the losses sustained in 1942 but were 
becoming stretched to their limit on how much damage they could adequately repair.
173
                                   
 In mid 1943, the RAF was gaining the logistical support from the Americans to increase 
their bombing campaign against Germany. Thus far in the strategic bombing effort, results were 
minimal and morale was unscathed.  The Allies began producing larger number of aircraft and  
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weapons to aid in the bombing campaign.  The RAF would start relying heavily on incendiaries 
to spread larger fires and would attack targets multiple times over the course of days or weeks to 
ensure fire, and damage control could not restore stability in the bombed out areas.
174
 The 
Americans would bomb by day while the British would bomb at night in accordance with the 
plans of the Casablanca Conference of 1943.
175
   
The RAF and USSAF would implement this new strategy in the summer of 1943. 
Historian and World War II veteran, Peter Calvocoressi, writes the first Allied firestorm started 
on July 27-28, 1943, in the city of Hamburg.
176
 Hamburg was a thousand year old city with 
origins dating back to Emperor Charlemagne. The city contained 3,000 industrial establishments 
and 5,000 commercial industries.  It had a million and a half inhabitants and most of the urban 
areas were wooden structured buildings.
177
  The city had been bombed 130 times already and had 
a civil defense organization that made speedy recovery efforts following each attack.
178
 
Operation GOMORRAH would be different.  The aerial attack began July 24 with a series of 
bombing raids that lasted until August 3. By the evening of the 27
th
 a firestorm had erupted from 
the intense bombing.  An average of 250,000 incendiary sticks and 7,000 liquid incendiary 
bombs were dropped per square mile.
179
 The Germans who were living in Hamburg at the time 
were shown what hell on earth was really like.  
Given the amount of firepower dropped in Hamburg, the heat from thousands of fires 
began superheating the air above.  The heat became so intense from above that it began sucking 
the oxygen from the surrounding area creating violent updrafts that produced gale force winds at 
ground level.  These winds were so intense that they carried more combustible material to the 
inferno‟s core, thus increasing the size and temperature of the fire.180  Air was sucked out of the  
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surrounding area, including cellars and shelters, forcing two billion tons of fresh air four miles 
above ground at 170 miles per hour in an air chimney. Some citizens were sucked into the 
furnace, some trees even snapped in half by the force of the winds.
181
 Calvocorresi puts the death 
toll at about 45,000, though it is difficult to say because the fire‟s temperature reached 1,000 
degrees centigrade, so many of the bodies were disintegrated.  Half the city‟s houses were 
destroyed and the other half damaged, leaving one million Germans civilians retreating from the 
city to tell their stories of what had happened.
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One survivor, Hans Nossack, wrote in great detail the unimaginable carnage left in the 
wake of the bombings.  Armed guards stood around the heavily damaged areas of the cities.  
Forced laborers had the job of incinerating dead bodies with flamethrowers.  The workers had 
difficulty reaching the bodies because enormous flies filled cellars and maggots the size of 
human fingers were making the cellar grounds too slick to walk on. He also added that the rats 
and flies were enormous.  The smell of burnt flesh was heavily nauseating.  The amount of dead 
rotting flesh was abundant and the creatures fed for weeks, many rats ate so much they couldn‟t 
move any longer.  Nossack said this didn‟t stop until the beginning of October, nearly two and 
half months later.
183
  
The second firestorm to ignite in a German city occurred in Kassel, shortly after the 
USSAF‟s disastrous “Black Thursday” raid in Schweinfurt. On October 3, 1943, the RAF began 
a preliminary raid to disrupt the Henschel locomotive works and ammunition depot west of 
Ihringshausen but missed their target and instead hit an air raid shelter in a children‟s hospital. 
The initial raid killed 90 children, 14 nurses, and a doctor.
 184
 This raid paled in comparison to 
the firebombing that occurred days later on October 22.  The 416,000 incendiaries dropped on 
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Kassel fell at a ratio of two per square yard.  The stream of bombers extended 90 miles with their 
main target being the city‟s old town.  Because Kassel was a thousand years old, it did not take 
long for the incendiaries to accelerate the flames throughout the city.  A firestorm erupted after 
only forty-five minutes of bombings.  Six firefighting teams tried to quench the flames but to no 
avail.  No aid could be sent from other fire departments because the nearest major city was 100 
miles away.  One in ten people in the city‟s center were killed, 10,000 total, a loss rate of 4.4 
percent compared to Hamburg which was 2.7 percent.
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Following the raids at Kassel and Schweinfurt, the strategic bombing campaign was 
halted due to mounting losses of planes and crews over German skies and to prepare for the 
upcoming Allied invasion of Europe.  Command temporarily shifted to Eisenhower to use the 
Allied Air Forces in preparation for the Normandy landings.  Eisenhower and Churchill both 
feared French and Belgian civilian casualties would be high during the preparations for the 
landings.  The original estimates of likely civilian deaths caused by the allied preparatory attacks 
were put at 80,000-160,000.
186
  Air Marshall Tedder then modified the plan and removed targets 
in densely populated areas from the list.  Chief of Air Staff Portal then put estimates at 10,500 
likely to be killed, a figure Churchill still did not agree with.
187
 Churchill sent a memo to 
President Roosevelt warning that such bombing deaths might cause the French to have hostile 
feelings toward the Allies during the liberation process.  Roosevelt then replied that the decision 
was a military, not a political one.
188
 From April 1 until June 5, 10,000 French and Belgian 
civilians were killed by the Anglo-American bombings during the D-Day preparations.  
Historian Henry Lytton agrees that the French and Belgian casualties were justified given the    
importance of the mission.  The bombings isolated the Normandy battlefields, keeping six out of 
seven German Panzer divisions from crossing French rivers to mass a beachhead assault, thus 
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possibly turning the invasion back into the water.  The civilian deaths were considered a low cost 
for such high benefits.
189
      
During the Normandy campaign, Churchill received news of a horrifying discovery in 
Germany occupied Poland.  Four Jewish prisoners from the Auschwitz extermination camp had 
managed to escape to Slovakia.
190
 The Jewish community sent a request to Switzerland and from 
there, London and Washington. The transmitted letter explained what was taking place at 
Auschwitz, along with details on how to bomb twenty railroad lines leading into the camps.  
Churchill gave all authority of the mission to John J. McCloy in the Pentagon.  Four appeals 
were made to destroy the lines of transportation in order to stop the mass killings of Jewish 
civilians.  McCloy‟s deputy noted that his answer was to “kill this” proposal.  There would be no 
raids on Auschwitz transportation lines and the case was closed.
191
  
During the summer of 1944, Hitler launched a series of terror attacks against England and 
other Allied areas using his V-1 and V-2 rockets.  During the war, 32,000 V-1s and nearly 6,000 
V-2s were produced.
192
The V-1 attacks began on June 12, with ten rockets being launched, four 
of which arrived in England.  V -2 attacks began in September, hitting targets in London.
193
  
Given the complicated guidance systems of the day, many of these weapons were horribly 
inaccurate, some didn‟t detonate and the ill conceived idea was a waste of precious German 
resources.  The rocket attacks came too late in the war to make a difference but the V-1 and V-2 
attacks had another purpose, to kill civilians.  In total, almost 9,000 civilians were killed with  
about 25,000 injured.
194
 The rocket attacks only angered the British citizens who were becoming 
increasingly tired of the war and were looking for a quick end and the destruction of Germany. 
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By late August, the Allied armies were stalled on the Western Front.  Reluctantly, 
Eisenhower gave Spaatz the approval to use area bombings to destroy the morale of the German 
people, seeing as how the German land armies were refusing to give up.  FDR never approved 
the use of indiscriminate bombings against civilians; however, he was aware of the attacks and 
never disapproved the application.
195
 In August, Churchill gave Harris the support he needed to 
do what was necessary and this was music to Harris‟s ears.196 From August, 1944 until April, 
1945, German cities would be bombed until they were unrecognizable. 
The Combined Bomber Offensive resumed and attacks became more intense than they 
had been during the pre-Normandy campaign.  On August 18, 1944, the town of Bremen was 
bombed again, for the twelfth time
197
.  This time was different in the fact that the damage was 
more extensive and almost all of the town would be destroyed.  The Allies dropped sixty-eight 
blockbusters, 10,800 phosphorus bombs, and 108,000 incendiary sticks on the remaining city.  
Another firestorm erupted, this time taking only thirty-four minutes to engulf the city.  59,000 
were left homeless by the attacks and over 1,000 were killed.  
198
 On September 30, 1944, 
Munster was hit for the fifth time, and by October 22 it had been attacked again.
199
  The bombers 
dropped 5,000 high explosives and 200,000 incendiary bombs on the city.  Two high explosives 
landed at the St. Rochus Hospital, killing 150 patients.  Munster lost 1,294 civilians killed during 
the raid and 90% of its historic old town was razed.
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By October, the Allies were anticipating a quick breakthrough across the Rhine into 
Germany.  The Allies wanted to show the Germans that the choice was no longer between 
victory or defeat, it was between defeat or annihilation.
201
Operation HURRICANE took place on 
October 14 and 15 consisting of two separate operations.  The RAF would bomb Duisburg and 
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the USSTAF would destroy what was left of Cologne.  The RAF hit Duisburg with 9,000 tons of 
bombs in just twenty hours.  Duisburg suffered 5,570 casualties during the raids.
202
 To continue 
the Allies “shock and awe” campaign, Cologne was hit shortly after Duisburg with 9,000 more 
tons of explosives.
203
 Throughout October, 1944, twenty-eight missions were flown over 
Germany, making it the most devastating month since the war had started. 
Historian Neil Gregor writes that during the first couple years of the Allied strategic 
bombing campaign, Nuremberg had been able to withstand the aerial attacks and city functions 
went on as normal.  By the beginning of 1945, the city was in utter ruin.  The multiple raids of 
1944 had left the city without most of its women and children, as they had evacuated to safer 
areas.  Armament factories were barely functioning and government officials were trying to give 
some illusion of bureaucratic control over a rapidly decaying situation.
204
 The governmental 
structure completely deteriorated after a massive raid on January 2, 1945.  The attack left the city 
without electricity, gas, water, and public transportation.  The mayor, realizing all hope was lost, 
gave up efforts of keeping order and stability and abandoned the city.
205
 In 1939, Nuremberg‟s 
population was 420,000.  Even by the end of 1942 the city‟s population was 361,000.  By May, 
1945, the population of Nuremberg was 180,000.
206
  Gregor writes that Nuremberg was one of 
the few the cities in Germany capable of withstanding multiple aerial bombardments from an 
enemy and did so quite well until the end of 1942.  However, with so much destructive capability 
like that presented by the allies in 1945, no city could have kept a normal prewar infrastructure.    
Since the beginning of the war, Harris had wanted to pull off a raid against Berlin that 
would cause a similar firestorm like the one that erupted in Hamburg in 1943.
207
  From 
November 1943-March 1944, heavy attacks were conducted on Berlin.  Resistance from the 
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Luftwaffe and ground defenses resulted in high losses for allies, especially the RAF.  Eisenhower 
pulled the RAF from the battle in order to consolidate air forces for the Normandy invasion and 
Harris‟s, ”Battle of Berlin” was considered a failure.208 On February 3, 1945, the USSTAF hit 
Berlin again, this time with over 1,500 aircraft attacking the city, killing or wounding 25,000 
Berliners.
209
(Many German historians argue the accuracy of this number). The bombers dropped 
a proportional amount of incendiaries on Berlin as they did Hamburg, yet a firestorm never 
erupted over Berlin during these raids.
210
  U.S. fire protection engineer James McElroy says that 
this was because Berlin was honeycombed with parapeted firewalls and lacked the inner city 
structures that existed in medieval fortification walls.
211
  This explains why firestorms occurred 
in some German cities and not others. 
The name Dresden sparks immediate controversy on Allied morality during World War 
II.  On one hand, Dresden can be considered a war crime by the Allies, but on the other hand, it 
has been justified as a ruthless show of military force.
212
  Dresden had been relatively unscathed 
by Allied attacks during the war.  The city was not a completely civilian target; it did have war 
producing industry vital to the Nazi war machine, especially marshalling yards.
213
 Many cities 
were being bombed into submission by this point in the war, but Dresden was different.  Jorg 
Friedrich believes that the city was intentionally firebombed. Dozens of cities were firebombed  
during World War II, but until September 1944, a firestorm could not deliberately be produced, 
which is why the firestorms in cities like Hamburg and Kassel were accidents.  However, given 
certain atmospheric conditions, weather patterns, and more powerful incendiary devices, the 
British quickly began to determine a mathematical formula for producing a firestorm.
214
 By 
February 1945 the British realized that with enough incendiary firepower, almost any German 
city could be turned into a firestorm. 
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The RAF raids began on the night of February 13-14, 1945.  The RAF dropped 404,000, 
four pound incendiary bombs on Dresden and 2,099 incendiary clusters; a combined total of over 
2,600 tons of explosives, which immediately started a firestorm.
215
 On the nights of February 14-
15, the Americans then dropped their payload of 1,235 tons of explosives on top of the firestorm, 
causing meteorological conditions that the Allied planners did not know could happen.  The 
internal temperature reached around 1,500 degrees Celsius (2,700 F), causing smoke to reach 
13,000 feet into the atmosphere.
216
  Many of the Americans didn‟t need their instruments to find 
Dresden because the fires could be seen from over one hundred miles away.
217
 
The Dresden firestorm was probably worse than others that erupted in Europe from 
Allied bombers. The heat was so intense that the tar from the streets melted, turning the streets 
into molten rivers draining into shelters.  Material around the firestorm would combust from 
extreme temperature exposure without coming in contact with the actual flames.  As the fire 
grew larger, it consumed all the oxygen from surrounding areas, feeding the massive firestorm.  
Because the oxygen was being drawn out of the city, many civilians died because the burnt 
oxygen was being replaced by carbon monoxide.
218
  Many tried to seek refuge in the city‟s great 
water reservoir but no protection was found.  The air became so hot and unbreathable that those 
in the reservoir tried to flee but could not scale the reservoir‟s smooth cement walls.219  
The attacks on Dresden were so horrific it was impossible to get an exact body count on 
how many Germans were killed.  Historian Tami Biddle thinks the body count could be as low as 
10,000, but this is unlikely because that represents only the count of recognizable bodies within 
the eight square mile city centre.
220
 Dresden was overcrowded at the time of the raids and had a 
major refugee problem.  Historian Robert Palter thinks the death toll could be as high as 
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150,000.
221
 At the height of the Cold War, East German accounts put the number of dead at 
35,000.
222
 Sixty years after the event, given enough time to really examine the records, the best 
estimate is probably 60,000 noncombatants were killed during the February raids on Dresden.
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Once the news of Dresden spread, many on both sides of the Atlantic were outraged.  The 
Associated Press immediately received word by a censor in the SHAEF that the United States 
had resorted to terror bombing.  Eisenhower dismissed this claim and stated that:                             
A) That there had been no change in the bombing policy.                                                                         
B) The USSTAF have always directed their attacks against military objectives and will continue 
to do so.                                                                                                                                               
C) The story was erroneously passed by a censor.
224
                                                                     
Harris was less concerned with British public opinion.  When asked why Dresden was targeted 
so severely, Harris replied, “Actually Dresden was a mass of munitions works, an intact 
government centre and key transportation centre to the East.  It is now none of these things.”225 
Operation CLARION was the codename given to the final destruction of German 
transportation lines, but, in reality, CLARION was largely aimed at breaking civilian morale and 
showing the Germans there was no chance of winning.
226
 Many in the USSTAF opposed this 
plan, for it was nothing more than destroying a defeated enemy.  General Doolittle warned 
against this for fear of retaliation against American POWs.  General Eaker opposed it by saying 
it will convince the Germans, “We are the barbarians they say we are, for it would be perfectly 
obvious of them that is a primarily large scale attack on civilians, as, in fact, it of course will 
be.”227 General Spaatz was hesitant about the attacks as well, but Chief of Staff George C. 
46 
 
Marshall wanted the attacks done and Eisenhower gave the approval to proceed with CLARION 
on February 22, 1945.
228
 
One day after CLARION was approved, the Allies bombed the small city of Pforzheim, 
creating another firestorm. Pforzheim had no real war making industry.  The main production of 
the city was jewelry and clock producing material.
229
  On the night of February 23, 1,151 tons of 
bombs hit the city creating one of the hottest firestorm of the war.  Because Pforzheim was so 
small and by the beginning of 1945, the RAF had firebombing down to a science, the bombers 
could carry out the attack in laboratory like conditions.
230
 The bombardment lasted twenty-two 
minutes, producing a firestorm with typhoon-like winds.  Because the attack was concentrated on 
such a small area, the temperature of the blaze reached an unbelievable 3,100 degrees 
Fahrenheit, roughly the temperature required to melt titanium.
231
  The blaze burned so much 
oxygen, survivors recalled feeling air being pulled from their lungs.  The damage was beyond 
catastrophic: 20,277 dead, roughly one out of every three people living in Pforzheim.
232
  
On March 12, the port town of Swinemunde was hit by the Allies.  What is so significant 
about the raid on Swinemunde is that most of the inhabitants there were refugees from East and 
West Prussia.
233
 1,100 aircraft bombed the town, killing 23,000 people. During the body cleanup, 
not a single soldier was found among the dead bodies, they were all women, children, and a few 
old men. The 8
th
 Air Force had no knowledge the inhabitants were mostly refugees and the attack 
was never referred to as a tragedy or massacre.  In fact, the U.S. Air Force listed the attack as 
nothing more than a transportation raid on enemy marshalling yards.
234
 
On March 16, Wurzburg, a city with no military importance was targeted by 225 
Lancaster bombers dropping 397,650 incendiary and 256 high explosive bombs on a city with no 
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defensive capability.
235
 A firestorm erupted and 90% of the city was engulfed in one giant flame 
in only seventeen minutes.  There were no bunkers, only seventeenth century fortifications that 
had been used during religious wars.  The city was destroyed, killing 5,000 of its residents.  
Ironically, less than three weeks later, a unit of 3,500 German soldiers took up a garrison in the 
ruins putting up a stiff resistance against the U.S. 7
th
 army. Thanks to the large amount of debris 
caused by the bombers a bitter six-day urban conflict erupted throughout the ruins.
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Hildesheim, a German city with a history that extended back to 815, was also demolished 
during CLARION.  The city had been hit strategically earlier with great success to knock out the 
city‟s transportation depot.  However, on March 22, Bomber Command hit the remaining rubble 
with 446 tons of bombs, liquidating the remainder of the city in only eighteen minutes.
237
 Eight- 
five percent of the historic buildings were destroyed, and 1,736 civilians were killed in the single 
raid alone.  The death toll would have been far more extensive, but a 12,000 pound tall boy that 
hit the city‟s hospital did not detonate on impact and was dismantled before it could explode.238  
The city was so badly destroyed that most of the historic buildings were not rebuilt until the 
1980s.   
Throughout March, other cities were indiscriminately hit by the Allied bombers.  In east 
central Germany, Chemnitz was hit on March 5 by 720 planes carrying over 1,000 tons of 
bombs.  One-third of the city area was burned down.  Two days later on March 7, 84% of 
Dessau, including the old Royal Residence, was destroyed.  On March 31, 1,100 tons of bombs 
were dropped on Halle, destroying one-fifth of the remaining houses.
239
  City by city, the Allies 
were determined to break the will of the German people by destroying their cities.  Given the 
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extent of the damage taken by the civilian population, it is remarkable that the German war 
machine was able to continue for as long as it did. 
As Bomber Command continued its search for more undestroyed cities, it was coming 
painfully clear to the Germans that they could not win the war.  However, they refused to 
surrender and were fighting fanatically even as the Allies were advancing on both sides.  On 
April 5, Harris complained that, “It was already extremely difficult to find suitable targets.”240 
Two days later, the U.S First Army had reached the Weser River.  To scare the populations in the 
area, German propaganda told civilians that all males between the ages of 14 and 65 were to be 
locked up in camps guarded by Jews and Negroes.  All women would be taken to Negro 
brothels.  This probably would have been preferred by the civilians of Nordhausen, who instead 
were hit by Allied bombers in early April, killing 6,000; 1,300 of whom were concentration 
camp prisoners.
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On April 8, 1945, one of the last bombing operations of the war took place in 
Halberstadt.  The Allies had been bombing the train station on the outskirts of the town since 
January, but by April, much of the city was destroyed, and many refugees were living in bombed 
out areas in the city.  65,000 people were in Halberstadt, 5,000 of whom were hospitalized in 
military hospitals.
242
 Many in the German military wrote, “We will never surrender,” on the 
walls of the city, knowing the American land forces were only forty miles away.  However, the 
American bombers came in destroying 50% of the structures of the city, including a munitions 
train that exploded with so much intensity that it left a 120 acre crater outside the city.  Three 
quarters of the city was destroyed along with somewhere between 1,800 and 3,000 inhabitants. 
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The exact number of dead is hard to determine because those persons near the munitions train 
were disintegrated when it exploded.
243
    
The Allied bombing campaign ended shortly after the last raid on Halberstadt.  The 
Germans had fought fanatically until the bitter end when Russian troops were meters away from 
the Fuhrer bunker in Berlin.  The bombing campaign has raised issues concerning the moral 
implications of the Allies‟ actions during World War II.  The strategic bombing of Germany was 
supposed to break civilian morale and end the war quickly.  Instead, it caused billions of dollars 
in damage to German cities and killed 600,000 Germans, mostly civilians, without really 
breaking the morale of the populace.  Historian A.C. Grayling in his book, Among the Dead 
Cities questions whether or not the bombings should be considered a crime. Ironically, the last 
raid on Nuremburg in March of 1945 was codenamed, “Grayling”, and after the war the Allies 
decided that the war crime trials were to be held in Nuremburg, which they referred to as being, 
“among the dead cities.”244   
While some of the strategic bombing targets were morally justified, especially those in 
preparation for D-Day and oil attacks, many were not.  Most of the attacks that Grayling and 
other authors consider to be immoral were the bombings that took place in the last eight months 
of the war.  It is important to note that as the tonnage of bombs dropped by the Allies increased 
in 1943 and 1944, so did German war production in virtually every category identified as a target 
by Bomber Command.
245
  It was only in the last few months of the war when the bombing 
campaign intensified that the German economy finally began slowing down.  The majority of 
bombs that were dropped on Germany during the war fell in this time frame, yet the targets were 
mostly civilian.  The 1943 attacks on Hamburg are almost justifiable in the fact that an Allied 
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victory was far from secured and Hamburg was a legitimate military target.  However, given the 
circumstances of the war and the brutality of the Nazis, extreme measures are sometimes 
necessary to defeat a greater evil.  Hitler did not condemn the Luftwaffe bombings of civilian 
cities; in fact, given the proper equipment and material, Hitler would have easily approved a 
firebombing of New York or London if he thought it would help the German war effort. 
The strategic bombings are not considered a war crime because during World War II 
there were no set laws for conducting aerial warfare on civilian populations.  The 1949 Geneva 
conventions protect civilians from this type of warfare, but these laws came four years too late.  
While the RAF‟s firebombing techniques may have been extreme and immoral, they were not 
illegal from an international standpoint.   During the Nuremburg trials, the Holocaust 
overshadowed any wrong doing from the allies, even the rape and pillage from the Soviet Union 
on the Eastern Front was widely ignored.  The trials were nothing more than victor‟s justice          
against a humiliated and defeated enemy.  Had the Allies lost the war, then the Allies would have 
no doubt been convicted of war crimes by German prosecutors for bombing civilians. However, 
the Allies won the war, and because it is the victors who write the history, Westerners tend to 
look at World War II through the eyes of the winners, not the losers. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 GERMANS AS VICTIMS? 
 In Europe, World War II ended on May 8
th
, 1945.  General Jodl signed the unconditional 
surrender of Germany and was allowed to speak. “With this signature, the German people and 
the German Armed Forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the hands of the victors…In 
this hour I only express the hope that the victors will treat them with generosity.”246 The speech 
fell on deaf ears.  The destruction that Nazi Germany had inflicted upon the world was 
unprecedented.  The civilians killed in Warsaw, in the Rotterdam raids, in the Battle of Britain, 
in the Soviet Union, and the Holocaust showed the Western nations that Germany had no regard 
for human life. On the Eastern Front, German occupiers killed as many as twenty million 
civilians as a result of their occupation of Poland and the Soviet Union.
247
  As the tides of war 
turned against the Nazis, it was the German civilians who now had to deal with the cruel realities 
created by modern war and by their political leaders.   
 Few nations have ever had to experience the humiliation and extreme defeat presented by 
“unconditional surrender”.  Although the Confederate States of America, Japan, and Italy had to 
face this harsh reality, Germany probably suffered the greatest.  Never before had a nation‟s 
infrastructure been as badly destroyed as that of Germany during World War II.  Immediately 
following the war, Germans faced a series of crises.  They had to deal with foreign occupation, 
war guilt, ethnic German expulsion from the East, division into East and West, and rebuilding 
the nation.  As a result, the notion of German civilian deaths was pushed to the background.  The 
topic of Germans as victims of the war gained recognition in the historical community only in 
the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany.  On the 
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50
th
 anniversary of the war‟s end, Germany held commemorations that both condemned Nazism 
and condoned, the idea of “Germans as victims of the war and regime.”248 It was only when 
Germany was reunited as one nation that the process of understanding and interpreting what 
happened during World War II could finally come to pass. 
 Immediately following the war, Germans had to deal with the harsh realities of defeat.  
Five million German men in uniform were killed during the war, or as a result of being sent to 
the Soviet Union as POWs.  Fifteen million Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe, while 
one million died in the process of migrating back to Germany.  At least one million German 
women, if not more, were raped by the Soviet forces.
249
  The bombing campaign left 600,000 
civilians dead and 7.5 million homeless.  3.6 million personal dwellings were destroyed and 131 
towns in Germany had been hit by Allied bombs.
250
  The Allies destroyed at least 600 acres in 21 
different cities, roughly the same amount of damage the Luftwaffe caused in London alone.  In 
cities like Hamburg and Berlin, over 6,000 acres of the cities were destroyed.
251
 Not only did the 
Third Reich cease to exist, but Germany ceased to exist as a nation state.  The German economy 
was destroyed, there was no government at any level, all military personnel were prisoners of 
war in their own land, and the millions of civilians in towns and villages were completely and 
utterly dependent on their former enemies for food, fuel, shelter, law, and order.
252
    
 The issue of German suffering and Germans as victims of the war is thought to be a 
recent topic; however, Germans themselves have always been fully aware of the cruelty they 
suffered at the hands of Allied bombers.  Historian Mary Nolan suggests that Germans, in 
private, have questioned the morality of Allied attacks and Nazi crimes for decades.
253
 In the 
West, the victims of World War II were considered to be Jews or other targets of Nazi brutality.   
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There was immense pressure from the Jewish communities in major Western cities to put all 
emphasis on Germans to take responsibility for their actions.  Cases of German suffering were 
largely ignored because the Holocaust was still fresh in everyone‟s memories.254  Nolan believes 
that the issue of German suffering must be viewed through the lens of the Cold War, and it was 
the struggle between communism and democracy that shaped the idea of Germans being victims 
of the air war, especially in East Germany.   
 After World War II ended, Dresden fell within the Soviet Union‟s occupation zone.  On 
February 13, 1946, the one-year anniversary of the bombing of Dresden, the mayor of the city, 
Walter Weidauer, placed the bombing in a narrative of fascism and antifascism. He said the 
bombing of Dresden was avoidable, the suffering meaningless, and that Germany should be held 
responsible for the war because too few Germans had resisted Hitler.  Three years later, as the 
Cold War intensified and the GDR had been established, the same mayor blamed the British and 
Americans for terror bombing the city, which had no military justification and took place when 
Germany was heading toward defeat.  On the five-year anniversary, a pro-communist flyer was 
handed out declaring that the imperialists of the United States knew the city would fall into the 
hands of the Soviet Union. It said the Americans turned the city into a heap of rubble to show the 
Soviet Union the destructive capability of the American military.  Nolan writes that it was on this 
anniversary that the East German government considered Dresden a “Victim” of an anti-Soviet 
campaign conducted by the Americans.  By the tenth anniversary, the attack was officially 
declared a war crime.
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 So in East Germany, the notion that Germans were, in fact, victims of 
the air war was always present but hidden behind the Iron Curtain.  
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 While the Soviets put pressure on the citizens of East Germany to remember the bombing 
campaign as a criminal act, the Americans put pressure on West Germany to remember the 
atrocities committed by the Red Army as they raped and pillaged their way to Berlin.  It was 
becoming apparent that Germany was on the front lines of the Cold War.  The Western powers 
began to accept West Germany as a valued ally and focused their attention on Soviet crimes 
against their own population, against Central Europe, and against the German Army at the end of 
the war when many were sent to prison camps in Siberia. The Americans reinforced the notion 
that the Soviet crimes of World War II were reminders of German humiliation and suffering.  
Nolan writes that the Western Allies took the focus off the Allied bombing war and put in on 
Russian barbarism.
256
  
 Nolan believes that public silence about the bombing campaign can be attributed to the 
extraordinary trauma experienced during area bombings.  She believes that postwar Germans, 
numb and unable to mourn, preferred to look forward, not back, devoting all their focus to the 
reconstruction of their shattered nation.  Germans more willing to acknowledge the magnitude of 
Germany‟s war time actions regarded the aerial bombardments as payback -- unpleasant, but 
inevitable and not to be dwelt on.
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 Nolan believes that it was easier for Germans to not want to 
know about it and preferred to go on about their lives and continue to focus on the future of 
Germany.
258
 
 Historian Thomas Childers writes that the air war and the notion of German suffering is a 
taboo subject to many in Germany, similar to a “shameful family secret”.259 Childers writes in 
his article, Facilis descensus averni est, that amateur war historians have been writing about the 
issue of German suffering for years, but these were outsider interpretations.  During the 
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economic miracle of the 1950s, Germany was thought by observers to be a place of well being, 
but on the contrary, Germany experienced much suffering during the 50s due to the severe 
destruction of its cities and infrastructure.  The only thing that kept Germans going was the 
realization that they were suffering together.
260
 Childers also notes that the bombing of German 
cities was, sadly, not the most destructive act of the war by any means.  The losses suffered by 
German civilians amounted roughly 5% of their prewar population.  When compared to Poland 
who lost most of its Jewish population, or the twenty-two million Soviets on the Eastern Front 
who perished, the issue of German suffering takes on a different perspective.  The German 
infrastructure was destroyed, but cities all over Eastern Europe suffered a similar fate, not by 
bombers but by ground fire.
261
  
 Childers‟ makes interesting points about air war doctrine before and during the war.  He 
makes the point to define the object of strategic bombing.  Officially, the objective was, 
“destroying the capacity of the enemy to make war.”262 The Allies knew this and so did the 
Germans.  During the Battle of Britain, Hitler, at a dinner at the Reich‟s Chancellery in 1940 
made the statement, “Goering wants to use incendiary bombs of an altogether new type to create 
sources of fire in all parts of London.  Fires everywhere.  Thousands of them.  Then they‟ll unite 
in one gigantic area conflagration.  Goering has the right idea.  Explosive bombs don‟t work, but 
it can be done with incendiary bombs-total destruction of London.”263 Of course, the Luftwaffe 
did not have the capability or the resources to conduct such devastating attacks, but if they had, it 
is safe to assume they probably would have firebombed London to the ground, along with other 
heavily populated cities.  That is the doctrine of strategic bombing.  Just because the Allies did 
have the capability of doing so and the Germans did not, doesn‟t make the Allies war criminals 
for firebombing German cities nor render Germans innocent victims.  As the war progressed, 
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Germany refused to surrender and the Allies had to bomb more indiscriminately in order to 
destroy Germany‟s economy and to ensure a victory.  The Allied military forces were not there 
to make friends; they were there to fight a war, a war Germany started.   
 Childers closes his article by saying that Germans are not victims of the war, only of their 
regime.  He believes that the Allies did not pursue a policy of annihilation against the Germans.  
The air war and strategic bombing was a new experience for everyone involved, from the pre- 
war theorists, to the bomber crews, to those hiding from the bombs; it was a new dimension of 
war.  There were no guidelines for the planners and no preparations for the bombed.  No one on 
the ground or in the bombers was prepared for what air war meant.  Strategic bombing involved 
attacking military targets, most of these targets lay in cities, and these cities were heavily 
populated.  Civilians lived in these cities and planners and bombers knew that civilians would 
become casualties.  In Childers‟ opinion, strategic bombing, more than any other form of 
combat, captures the horrors, complexity, and moral ambiguity of modern warfare.
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 Robert Moeller, a historian from the University of California, Irvine, has written several 
articles that deal with the issue of German suffering and Germans as victims.  In one of his 
articles, Germans as Victims?  Thoughts on a post-Cold War history of World War II legacies, 
Moeller makes similar points as Childers.  Moeller uses the same quote as Chiders to describe 
the German air war as a, “shameful family secret”.265 He too, like Nolan, views the problem of 
remembrance through the politics of the Cold War.  Dresden, immediately following the war, 
was a symbol of British and American imperialism.  The official Soviet version was that the 
civilians of Dresden fell victim to the Western weapons of mass destruction.
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 The Soviet Union 
declared itself the great liberator of Germany, blaming the Western allies for the East German‟s 
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misfortunes.  However, in private discussions around the dinner table, most survivors in East 
Germany passed on stories to their kids about Soviet atrocities.  This did not mesh with the 
framework of the Red Army being the great liberators.
267
 In West Germany, remembrance of the 
air war and the Nazi regime was heavily influenced by the Cold War.  By the 1950s, West 
Germany‟s main priority was to rebuild and forget about their past.  Instead of alienating the 
West Germans, the Western Allies were quick to agree that it was Adolf Hitler and the Nazi 
Party who were responsible for the destruction throughout Europe, not the German army and 
certainly not the German civilians.  The goal for the Western Powers was to rebuild and forget so 
they could all concentrate on the new enemy, the Soviet Union.
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 Moeller, like Childers, is 
convinced that in the GDR, the idea was not to forget but to remind the citizens of Western 
atrocities to stir hatred toward the Western Allies and democracy.  However, in the FRG, the 
goal was to forget the past and focus on the present.  The Allies wanted West Germany to be 
rebuilt, restructured, and reinforced with democratic ideas because the Western allies realized the 
importance that West Germany was going to have during the Cold War. 
 On the History of man-made destruction: Loss, Death, Memory, and Germany in the 
Bombing War is another article by Robert Moeller concerning remembrance and victimization in 
West Germany.  This article reinforces what Moeller argued in “Germans as Victims”, which is 
that the Cold War presented new challenges faced by West Germany to come to terms with the 
air war and its Nazi past.  The point of Moeller‟s article is to pinpoint exactly when Germans 
stopped becoming the perpetrators of the Holocaust and became the victims of the Allied 
bombing campaign.  He explains that this was a gradual process.  During the 1950s and into the 
1960s, the German civilians who experienced the bombing campaign first hand tried to forget 
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their Nazi past, rebuild their country, and look to the future.  During the economic miracle in 
Germany during the 1950s, this idea seemed like it worked. 
 During the late 1960s and the 1970s, the radical German youth, who were too young to 
remember the air war or any direct Nazi experiences broke the silence of Germany‟s dark past.  
In West Germany, tales of the air war were confined to private settings, as the “68ers” made 
public acknowledgement that their parents were, in one way or another, willing participants in 
the National Socialist regime.
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 Just like the American generation of the late 1960s, the German 
youth rebelled against their parents and wanted change.  They blamed their parents for doing 
nothing to stop the Third Reich from committing unspeakable acts and criticized their parents‟ 
behavior after the war for wanting to rebuild their nation and forget the past.  The destruction 
caused by the air war and the German loss of life was the price that had to be paid for the 
atrocities of National Socialism.
270
 This generation made no mention of moral suffering of their 
parents, for that would be seen as an apologia of a sort. 
 West and East Germany were unified in 1990 after almost 45 years of separation.  
Moeller believes that this was the third and most important phase of German remembrance 
because it was only after Germany could be one again that the wounds of World War II could be 
healed.  As one German newspaper wrote following the collapse of the Soviet Union, “Only now 
is the war over”.271 Not only Germany, but all countries behind the Iron Curtain, could now 
come to terms with everything from the Holocaust to Soviet oppression.  Since 1990, the 
Holocaust has remained the center point in Germany‟s focus on remembrance as both East and 
West Germans began building monuments and memorials dedicated to the Jews who lost their 
lives during World War II.
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 However, as a unified Germany began to come to terms with its 
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past, Moeller believes that one man began shifting the German mentality of victimization, a 
former 68er named Jorg Friedrich.   
 Friedrich‟s book, Der Brand (The Fire), was released in Germany in 2002.  Moeller 
believes this book sparked interest in the air war in Germany again.  The book recounts in 
painful detail the horrors that German civilians experienced during the bombing raids.  The book 
was a huge success in Germany, and was later translated in to English in 2006.  In the fifth 
chapter of the book, Friedrich has a segment entitled, “Bombing victims”.273  Many believe that 
Friedrich is responsible for breaking the taboo that Germans have kept silent about for decades, 
which is that Germans are victims, not of their regime, but of war crimes.
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 Following Der 
Brand, a documentary was aired in Germany that showed the destruction of Germany created by 
the bombing campaign and the air war became a hot topic in the historical community.  Moeller 
insists that Friedrich did not break the taboo of the air war in Germany.  He believes that people 
have had knowledge of the devastation and unfairness that the air war created.  The taboo for 
Friedrich was not one of speaking; rather, it was one of listening.
275
 Once people began listening 
and understanding what German civilians endured under the bombs, many started questioning 
the difference between the victims of Germans and the German victims.  Moeller is critical of 
Friedrich, however, especially Friedrich‟s comparison of the bomber squadrons to the 
Einsatzgruppen (German death squads on the Eastern Front).
 276
  He also criticizes Friedrich for 
only telling one side of the story, the story of German suffering from allied bombers.  He also 
notes that there is too much involved with the bombing campaign for a lone historian to make the 
assessments that Friedrich made against the Allies.
277
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 Omer Bartov, a European historian of Jewish ancestry, is a historian at Rutgers 
University.  He writes that Germans cannot be viewed through the same lens as Holocaust 
survivors in using the term victim.  Bartov raises an interesting point in that both the Germans 
and the Holocaust survivors tend to present themselves as victims.
278
 The distinguishing factor in 
victimization is that the Germans were either neutral or willing participants in Hitler‟s regime.  If 
they had been outwardly opposed, they might have been killed for speaking out against their 
government.  In the case of Jews, they were singled out and exterminated no matter what their 
beliefs were.  Allied bombers bombed indiscriminately, with no intent on exterminating the 
German race.  As far as victimization, Germans tend to believe that they had little in common 
with Jewish suffering at the end of the war, but they naturally felt their own suffering very 
keenly.
279
   
 Many historians believe that the East Germans suffered far greater than those in the West,  
the logic being that the government established after World War II was nothing more than 
replacing one dictatorial regime with another, Nazism and Hitler with Communism and Stalin.  
Thus, East Germans were victims of the Nazi regime and of the Soviet regime.  Bartov disagrees 
with this concept.  While violence was important to both regimes, the Soviets never had a task of 
the total annihilation of a particular group like the Nazi attempt at Jewish genocide.
280
 There was 
never any instance that the Soviets during, before, or after World War II ever engaged in 
industrialized killing.  The Soviets viewed extermination as means to a goal, unlike the Nazis 
who viewed it as the goal itself.
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 So while things in West Germany were better for the average 
German, Eastern Germans still cannot be considered any more of a victim than a West German 
during the Cold War years. 
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 There are those historians who do not believe that Germans can be defined as victims of 
the air war or of the Nazi regime.  However, as more research is conducted, many historians are 
beginning to sympathize with the German civilians who endured the aerial bombings and Soviet 
atrocities committed during the Second World War.  With the Cold War finally over, all 
dimensions of World War II are being analyzed more and more, especially the issue of Germans 
as victims.  As Moeller noted, the topic of the air war over Germany has gained notoriety after 
Friedrich‟s publication of Der Brand in 2002, and it was Friedrich‟s opinions that have helped 
fuel the controversy of strategic bombing and the issue of German suffering during and after 
World War II. 
 Jorg Friedrich was born in Germany on August 17, 1944, right as the bombing campaign 
was intensifying.  Friedrich is a historian, having written several books on World War II, 
especially the cruelty of the air war and the unfair treatment of Germans after the war.  Friedrich 
acknowledges that his book, Der Brand, is biased, and so is he.
282
  Friedrich thinks that the 
American and British readers of his book already have their own opinions of World War II and 
the German people, so a Western perspective will differ from a German reader‟s perspective.  
Because the Anglo-American forces won the war, most British and Americans view the air war 
as a necessity to destroy the evil Nazi regime that systematically murdered millions of Jews and 
spread oppression across Europe.   
 Friedrich makes numerous valid points about German victimization.  His book doesn‟t go 
into World War II politics, Nazi brutality, or Cold War enemies, instead, he writes a 500-page 
book on how horrible and destructive the bombings in Germany were.  He writes about the 
senseless murder of German civilians and the destruction of irreplaceable buildings, monuments, 
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cathedrals, etc. that were destroyed by allied bombs.  The target audience is obviously German 
readers.
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 Because American and British authors have been writing hundreds of books that are 
concentrated on Allied themes in multiple theatres of war, Friedrich wanted to add another theme 
to the list, the German civilians who lived under the bombs.  The feel of Der Brand is harshly 
critical of the Anglo-American conduct of the air war, especially the RAF‟s involvement.   
 Friedrich condones Allied involvement in Germany after the war‟s end, when many 
Germans were prosecuted as war criminals during the Nuremberg trials.  The Allies never 
convicted any German officer for the blitz against London or V-1 or V-2 attacks, which all 
totaled killed 43,000 British civilians.  Had the Allies made any conviction on these attacks, the 
Allies would have appeared hypocrites, which is why they convicted those in the German air 
forces of other crimes that would favor the Allied conduct of strategic bombing.
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 Friedrich has 
brought up the fact that many Wehrmacht generals who were charged with killing civilians 
defended themselves by saying it was necessary, and so was the death of German civilians 
because it was a legitimate means to wage total war.  In total war, the battle is waged on all 
fronts and civilian populations cannot be spared, and in any case those generals felt as they had 
done nothing different from the Allies during the war.  They were not critical of the Allied 
strategic bombing campaign, for they knew consequences of waging total war and knew the 
repercussions for their actions.
285
  
 Historian Michael Bess questions the case of Germans as victims in the bombing war 
during World War II.  He says the bombing campaign is a double edged sword and must be 
viewed from both sides, Allied and German.  He asks, “If killing hundreds of thousands of 
noncombatants played a key role in securing Allied victory, did this taint the victory with an 
63 
 
indelible stain of innocent blood?”286 When viewing the air war from an Allied perspective, three 
factors must be taken into account.  The first is that the Allies were engaged in a desperate war in 
which their very survival was at stake.  Second, the enemy was using barbaric forms of warfare, 
and if the Allies had not adopted the enemy‟s methods then they might not have prevailed.  Last, 
the technology was growing and developing swiftly and in all out warfare, if a weapon exists that 
will save lives on your own side and hasten the demise of the enemy, you will most likely use 
it.
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 Strategic bombing, from Bess‟ point of view, played a crucial part in securing an Allied 
victory.  He also believes that many of the Anglo-American bombing practices can be justified 
by the importance of the targets being destroyed.
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 To say that all forms of strategic bombing 
are morally wrong is to lose sight of the reality of total war.  He says that trying to imagine 
World War II without strategic bombing reveals just how crucial a part this campaign played in 
an overall Allied victory. Without the air war, the Germans could have relocated valuable war 
assets from the air defense to the Eastern Front.  Just as importantly, the Allied victory could 
never have been secured without the air war as a second front and the superiority of the skies 
over Europe.
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 From a German perspective, Bess concludes, there was no excuse at the war‟s end for the 
large scale area bombing and firebombing of the cities; they were atrocities pure and simple.  
They were atrocities because the Anglo-Americans could have won the war without resorting to 
them.  By mid-1944, the Allies had the technology and knowledge to conduct a different kind of 
aerial warfare: far more precise, measured, and controlled.  Instead, the Allies chose to bake and 
boil tens of thousands of noncombatants at a time on an ever escalating scale.
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 No amount of 
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collateral damage can obscure the fact that the bombings and firebombing of German cities 
amounted to little more than indiscriminate butchery – a form of warfare in which the military 
benefit of the operation was outweighed by the colossal human cost.
291
  So from Bess‟ 
perspective, the Germans were victims of Allied atrocities only because the firebombing of 
German cities after mid-1944 were avoidable acts of mass murder.  Prior to the summer of 1944, 
the outcome of the war was uncertain and some acts of the bombing campaign could be noted as 
necessity.   
 Historian Michael Geyer writes in his article, “The Place of the Second World War in 
German Memory and History”, that Germans are not only victims of the Second World War, but 
victims of the 20
th
 century.  The issue of German suffering and death has become Germany‟s 
signature.  He says for the first time since World War I, a generation in Germany is growing up 
that has confronted the experience of wholesale death only indirectly-precisely through history.
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This cannot be said of any generation born in German from 1900-1989, although the latter 
generation experience war trauma indirectly, through their parents or grandparents. 
 Geyer believes that German society has repeatedly gone through the death zone, from the 
battlefields and blockades of World War I to the battlefields and bombings of World War II and 
lastly through surviving the threat of being on the front lines of the Cold War and facing the very 
possibility of nuclear annihilation. The problem with Germany is that its people are always going 
to have to accept and reflect upon the experience of mass death and suffering they experienced.  
The present generation is left to separate those Germans who killed and those Germans who 
were killed.
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 Geyer compares the civilians and the killers to the biblical Cain and Abel in 
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which no matter what the German civilians do to kill their Nazi past, they will always be held 
responsible for it.
294
  
 Author A.C. Grayling opens his book, Among the Dead Cities, with a quote from a 
member of the U.S. State department to the British Ambassador in Washington, on 18 October, 
1945, saying, “The term, „war crimes‟…includes…murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during 
the war.”295 Given the definition of a war crime by the U.S. State Department, this means that the 
strategic bombing of Germany was a war crime.  This also leaves the German civilian population 
a victim of war crimes committed by the United States and Great Britain.   
 Grayling, like Bess, believes that not all strategic bombings during World War II were 
criminal acts.  He too believes that some of the raids conducted prior to mid-1944 were justified 
by their military significance.  Bombing of oil targets, V-weapon launch sites, railway lines, U-
Boat pens all killed people but they were necessary casualties of war.
296
 However, it cannot be 
said that dropping thousands of tons of explosives remorselessly on civilian targets is a side 
effect of war, especially when victory is clearly at hand.
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 Grayling makes an interesting comparison on moral implications of strategic bombing 
and victimization during war.  Pearl Harbor, for example, was a preemptive military strike on the 
United States during World War II.  While it was a military strike, many civilians were killed as 
a direct result of the attack, yet nobody considers them “victims” because it was a legitimate 
military strike. However, on September 11, 2001, when terrorists flew planes into the Twin 
Towers, this constituted a deliberate terrorist attack on a civilian population with no military 
justifications.
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 After 9/11, the dead and wounded are considered by many to be victims because 
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they were unwilling participants in a deliberate civilian attack.  They suffered only because they 
were in the Twin Towers in the United States on the morning of September 11.
299
 Grayling asks 
how the attacks on Hamburg differed from those on September 11, 2001.  They were both aimed 
at civilian populations with the center piece being to inflict the maximum hurt, shock, disruption, 
and terror. He believes that whether or not these attacks are in the midst of war or not, they are 
both moral atrocities.
300
 While Grayling admits that this is not the best comparison, it still raises 
valid arguments.  Why are the casualties of 9/11 considered victims and those of Hamburg and 
other destroyed civilian cities not?  Grayling believes that we as the victors of World War II do 
not pretend to have clean hands ourselves, instead we claim that our hands are far cleaner that 
those of the people who plunged the world into war and carried out horrible crimes under its 
cover, and it is that explanation, not excuse, that we allow our own hands to get dirty.
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 The question of whether Germans can be considered victims is one of the most 
problematic questions involving the strategic bombing of Germany.  There seems to be a divide 
in the historic community, with some saying yes, while others say no.  No matter how hard they 
try, Germans will never be able to lose their Nazi past.  There is no amount of reparations to pay, 
monuments to build, and cities to rebuild that can hide what Nazi Germany unleashed on the 
world.  Many view the bombing campaign as a necessity of winning the war, while others view it 
as an aerial holocaust against the German people whose only crime was living in Germany under 
a brutal dictatorship.  So, were Germans victims of the air war?  Or just of their regime?  Or are 
Germans victims of the failed Weimar Republic established by the West, which ultimately led to 
the Nazi Party rise to power?  Maybe one day Germans can be viewed as victims of the war, in 
the same sense Holocaust survivors are, but maybe Hans Frank was right.  Before he was hanged 
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at Nuremburg, he said, “A thousand years will pass and the guilt of Germany will not be 
erased.”302 
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CHAPTER 5  
 CONCLUSION 
 The bombing campaign had been debated by historians, philosophers, and scholars since 
World War II ended over sixty years ago.  There have been hundreds, if not thousands, of books 
written about World War II in the past several decades; this is because World War II was the 
most important event of the 20
th
 century and one of the most important events in human history.  
There are multiple dimensions of the war, but one of the most highly debated areas of the war 
remains the strategic bombing campaign.  I chose to research the bombing of Germany because 
there are so many different opinions by historians questioning the effectiveness, morality and 
German victimization, that in order to form an accurate analysis, a historiography must be done 
to try to absorb all the information and make a fair assessment.   
 The effectiveness of the bombing campaign is most apparent.  It is safe to assume that 
without the bombing campaign, victory would have been impossible or extremely difficult.  
Prewar planners and theorist believed that aerial bombing would effectively shut down war 
production and destroy valuable military targets.  This was not exactly true.  Although the 
bombing of German cities damaged war production and slowed down the German war machine, 
it failed to bring the German economy to a halt.  The fact that German production remained high 
until 1944 showed that it takes indiscriminate round the clock bombing of cities to slow the 
German economy down enough to begin to see results, even then, production never came to 
complete standstill. 
 The bombing of German cities was highly ineffective in breaking German morale as well.  
This part backfired as Germans became more and more enraged and fought harder to repair their 
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factories and industry in the face of Allied attacks.  This was a lesson that should have been 
learned by the Allies, especially the British, during the Battle of Britain.  The Germans remained 
very defiant until the bitter end because they knew they faced Allied occupation if they gave in 
to the unconditional surrender that was demanded by the Allies.  They knew that the Allies were 
trying to break their will to fight which is what fueled their anger and their will to resist more, 
even as the attacks intensified. 
 Although the strategic bombing doctrine did not live up to its prewar expectations, it was 
still a deciding factor in the Allied victory in Europe.  The German army was forced to divert 
much needed planes, anti-aircraft guns, and soldiers to the air war over Europe.  If the Allies had 
not conducted the bombing campaign, these resources could have been used on the Eastern Front 
against the Soviet Union, which by 1942 the outcome was still in question.  Because the Allies 
were not ready to open up a second front on the ground in Europe in 1942, they were able to 
open one up in the sky, which took some pressure off of the Soviet Union until the invasion of 
Normandy in 1944.   
 The morality of the bombing campaign is not as clear as the effectiveness.  The 
intentional bombing of civilians is obviously tragic.  When civilians get caught in the cross fire 
of warfare, bullets and bombs do not distinguish between those willing participants or those who 
opposed the regime.  It is certainly most tragic when the casualties of the bombings were kids, 
who were impartial to the war and the politics of their government.  However, what authors like 
Grayling, Friedrich, Bess, and others neglect to write about, are the horrible atrocities committed 
by the Nazis.  Twenty million Soviets, ten million Jews and other unwanted peoples, and 
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hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers were killed as a result of Nazi Germany and the war it 
started.   
 Firestorms were inhumane acts of war, but strategic bombing was a new weapon of war 
and when a nation has a new weapon during wartime it uses it.  There were no set rules to follow 
for strategic bombing, so the Allied commanders had to make the best decisions they could and 
hope the decisions they made were the right ones.  If Nazi Germany had the means to conduct 
aerial bombings on the same scale that the Allies did, it would not have hesitated to use the 
bombers to wage warfare on an unimaginable scale. World War II presented cruelty and 
barbarity on a level never thought possible.  If the United States and Britain did not use the 
weapons they had at their disposal, the war could have lasted longer or turned in the favor of the 
Axis.  When confronted with evil, one must do whatever is necessary to defeat that evil and 
insure that it never happens again. 
 The question of Germans as victims is a touchy subject with no definitive answer.  After 
reading The Fire it was difficult not to feel sympathy for the German civilians caught in the 
midst of war.  As badly as I feel for the German people who withstood the bombings, I still 
cannot consider them “victims” of the Allied bombing campaign or Soviet reprisals.  The 
survivors of concentration camps or atrocities on the Eastern front are victims because they were 
murdered for being born Jewish or Slavic.  The German civilians who were bombed or 
experienced Soviet reprisals are casualties of war, not victims, because their fate was an outcome 
of a war their nation started.   
 The Allies did not go into the bombing campaign with the intention of systematically 
destroying the entire race of Germanic people.  The goal established by the Allies was to destroy 
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the German‟s capability to wage war and by 1945 that goal was accomplished.  While many 
Germans died during bombings, that was an unfortunate but understood side effect of total war.  
The experience of the bombed was no doubt a terrifying experience.  The mass rapes committed 
by the Soviet Union in Germany were an awful consequence of being conquered as well.  
However, Hitler and his high ranking Nazis went into the war with the intention of murdering all 
the Jews in Europe.  The majority of German people basked in the glory of their early victories 
and it was only after the tides of war had turned against them that their attitudes began to change.   
 In another sense, Germans are victims.  They are victims of circumstance.  The British 
and French forced the German government into signing the humiliating Treaty of Versailles 
following World War I.  This led to a collapse of the German social, political, and economic 
structure throughout the 1920s.  With the country in turmoil, the Nazis came to power and began 
solving the problems that plagued Germany for years.  The people of Germany were vulnerable 
and the Nazis were able to make Germany great again.  Out of sheer desperation, the people of 
Germany blindly followed a government that had helped them out when nobody else would.  It 
was this obedience that would ultimately lead to disastrous consequences for the people of 
Germany. 
 As the years pass on, the way we remember past events takes on a new perspective. 
Perhaps one day Germans can be viewed as victims and World War II will be a reminder of the 
last great conflict the world has ever seen.  With veterans and survivors of the air war dying off 
quickly, it is important to remember the sacrifices they made and the experiences they endured.  
Historians need to keep arguing the importance of the air war and questioning the effectiveness, 
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morality, and victimization.  It‟s these arguments that keep the memories of World War II alive 
in hope that history won‟t repeat itself. 
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